INTERMEDIATE SOCIETIES, SOCIAL MOBILITY, AND COMMUNICATION

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1959 ANNUAL SPRING MEETING

AMERICAN ETHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Intermediate Societies, Social Mobility, and Communication

Proceedings of the 1959 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological Society

Edited by Verne F. Ray

PREFACE

THE ANNUAL Spring Meeting for 1959 of the American Ethnological Society was held at the Brooklyn Museum, Brooklyn, New York, on Friday and Saturday, May 29 and 30. The two-day session was an innovation, since the custom of the Society had been to give but one day to the Spring Meeting. The first day was devoted to invited student papers, with representation from Columbia University, Yale University, New York University, Bryn Mawr College, and Hofstra College. The theme for the papers of the second day was "Approaches to the Study of Intermediate Societies." Additional papers were presented on social mobility, communication, and literature.

The program committee consisted of Eric R. Wolf, chairman, Morton H. Fried, and Gertrude Dole. The success of the meeting which they arranged is evidenced by the decision of the Board of Directors to continue the two-day plan.

The present volume contains papers from the May 30 session plus one student paper from the presentations of the preceding day. Mrs. Silverman's paper was selected to represent the student offerings because of its quality and because its subject fitted well the theme of the meeting.

The paper by Dr. Lesser represents a further innovation in the *Proceedings*. It presents in written form the extended comments which were made by him during the discussion of Dr. Casagrande's essay. It is to be hoped that in the future we may have a stenographic transcription of the discussions following the various papers so that selections can be made for inclusion in the *Proceedings*. In this way we could realize even more meaningfully the objective of the Board of Directors in authorizing the publication of the *Proceedings*--the sharing of the values of the meeting with members unable to attend.

Verne F. Ray, Editor

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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE STUDY OF INTERMEDIATE SOCIETIES

Joseph B. Casagrande

MY PURPOSE in this paper is to set down for further consideration some preliminary thoughts gleaned from one kind of reading of the trends of the anthropological times.[1] Much of what I shall have to say is based on a lively tradition of anthropological research, most notably exemplified in the work of the late Robert Redfield whose writings from *Tepoztlan, A Mexican Village* (1930) to his last, as yet unpublished papers (Redfield, n.d.), manifest an increasing concern with the problems we shall discuss here. I have also drawn heavily on the work and thoughts of a number of persons, many of whom are present today, who participated in an exploratory conference on intermediate types of societies held at the Social Science Research Council in October 1958.[2] And I have benefited from the opportunity to read in advance several of the papers to follow on this symposium.

We may perhaps best begin with a few highly telescoped comments on the recent history of our discipline.

Were we to survey the groups among which anthropologists have conducted their research during the past fifty or sixty years we would, I believe, note that in the earlier decades the great majority of field studies were undertaken among small, homogeneous, and relatively self-sufficient nonliterate groups in Australia, the Americas, the Pacific Islands, the fringes of continental Asia, and to a lesser extent in Africa. Social anthropology was then defined by many as precisely the study of such peoples (e.g., Radcliffe-Brown, 1923). Our habits of thought and work were largely formed in studying these "classical simple societies," and they gave us our first descriptive and analytic models. Our guiding concept was culture. Our way of working can be described as a process of total and lengthy immersion in the life of the people. These, the very hallmarks of our profession, are peculiarly suited to the study of such peoples and were refined as our experience among them deepened.

However, whether out of choice or necessity, and while still cherishing this heritage, anthropologists since about 1930 have increasingly turned their attention to societies of quite another sort. Other place names and peoples begin to figure more prominently in research plans and in the titles of anthropological reports: Japan, India, Ireland and other European countries, the Caribbean, the "mixed" cultures of Latin America, the more sophisticated groups of Africa and Asia, and Plainville, U.S.A. We begin to hear of studies of folk cultures, of peasant groups, of community studies, where "community" is usually to be understood as a local group taken as an exemplar or microcosm of some larger social or cultural entity of which it is a typical part.

The reasons for this shift are surely complex. (A study of it would make an illuminat-

ing contribution to the history of anthropology.) The change is doubtless due both to a "natural" expansion of the scope of anthropologists' interests, whatever its source--scientific, political, or administrative--as well as to the fact that there are left in the world very few if any isolated aboriginal groups. Indeed, the continued existence of the latter is a veritable anthropological fiction. All such peoples are today under the jurisdiction of an external state or other body. As such, they are subject to marked influences and controls from the outside, and are well aware of that fact.

More is involved here than a simple shift in scale, say, from a small localized group to a large African tribe occupying an extensive territory,[3] or from nonliterate to literate or partially literate groups. Such differences, largely on the level of complexity, have, to be sure, their own important methodological and theoretical consequences. However, there is another qualitative difference that I believe to be of crucial importance: many, perhaps the majority, of field studies are today being undertaken among groups and in communities that are contained within a larger society, to which they are articulated in various ways and that partake of a larger cultural tradition. These are part societies and part cultures, and for purposes of this discussion this is the most salient fact about them.[4]

With an apology for adding to the already abundant taxonomic confusion, I shall use the term *intermediate societies* to refer to these multifarious types of societies that stand in this middle range between the relatively self-contained tribal group or "primitive isolate" on the one hand and the urbanized center, metropolitan community, nation, state, or civilization on the other and that, as subsocieties and subcultures, stand in a certain relationship, usually of dependency, to the encompassing societies and cultures. I do not, however, find the term intermediate societies wholly satisfactory. "Intermediate" is ambiguous in that it is used in two senses, referring both to the middle ranges of a distribution of societal types and to their function as social and cultural intermediaries. I believe that the two meanings are significantly related, although it may prove wiser to keep them conceptually separate. And "society" is used in a sense that varies somewhat from common sociological usage where it generally refers to a more self-sufficient system of social action with more sharply defined boundaries. However, despite such deficiencies, I think the term has some utility. Its meaning is comparatively neutral, without the troublesome freight of connotation of words such as "peasant" or "folk" which it subsumes; and it does not supplant any other well-established term.

In a sense intermediate societies are those societies or segments of societies that fall between the familiar typological poles of folk and urban, sacred and secular, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft,* and similar dichotomous terms. I say "in a sense" because intermediate societies are not seen as varying continuously in a number of commensurable dimensions; they are not necessarily scalable along a single folk-urban continuum. Nor in this conception are intermediate societies necessarily regarded as *transitional* forms between an earlier and a later stage of development.[5] In historical or evolutionary perspective they may well be intermediate in a developmental sense, but for our purposes this is another problem.

As conceived here, the intermediate society is not then initially defined either historically or with reference to its internal characteristics--psychological, social, or cultural. This is not to say that a description of them following, say, Redfield's characterization of the folk society and its urban opposite would be inaccurate (Redfield, 1947). However, such a description would, in this view, be incomplete. The distinguishing characteristic that marks them as members of a class of societies is a social structural attribute--their

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articulation with the larger society. Many of their particular characteristics (e.g., institutional structures, social class composition, certain mediating social roles or "offices") are dependent upon or are a reflex of the larger society, and can only be understood with reference to their connection with it, and to the types, intensity, and duration of these connections. As Wolf (1957, p. 7) has written, "In each case the kind of peasant community appears to respond to forces which lie within the larger society to which the community belongs rather than within the bounds of the community itself."[6] In this passage Wolf points up an important problem for further comparative study.

As defined, the term intermediate societies subsumes *multifarious types* of societies, thus suggesting the need for a typology of these societies. It is always tempting to typologize. However, it is risky to develop typologies out of theory unless put repeatedly to the test of empirical research; the premature formulation of such classificatory schemes can be as much an impediment as a spur to research and analysis. While the development of a comprehensive typology of intermediate societies can perhaps be taken as an ultimate goal, a more modest first objective would be to classify them on an areal or regional basis.[7] Thus Arensberg has suggested that there are four distinct types of peasant societies in Europe,[8] although these have not yet been carefully differentiated. The latter observation points to a prior task--the construction of any typology of intermediate societies must await the specification of the criteria that might be used to classify and compare them. Oscar Lewis, in his illuminating comparative analysis of villages in India and Mexico (1955), indicates some of the criteria that can be productively employed for this purpose. I shan't attempt here to add to the list of variables he mentions except to suggest that they be viewed, as Lewis does exogamy and endogamy, with an eye to their differential consequences for relationships with the greater community. As Lewis himself observes, "All tribal and peasant societies have some relations with the outside. It might therefore be more profitable to compare the nature, occasions, and quality of these relations" (1955, p. 168).

Perhaps it would be helpful to compare briefly this notion of the intermediate society with a number of related conceptions current in the literature. I have already suggested several comparisons with the classical formulation of the folk-urban continuum, and shall add only one further comment. If my reading of Redfield and the others who have contributed to this formulation is correct, both the distinctive and self-sufficient tribal group as well as societies that we would call intermediate are comprehended in the concept of the "folk society" (or a related term) as an ideal type. To my mind classifying them together overlooks a crucial distinction between societies that are essentially autonomous and those that are not.[9]

The "folk society" as redefined by George Foster in his article, "What is Folk Culture?" takes this distinction into account. Foster writes: "According to this concept, a folk society is not a whole society, an isolate, in itself. It is a 'half-society,' a part of a larger social unit (usually a nation) which is vertically and horizontally structured. The folk component of this larger unit bears a symbiotic spatial-temporal relationship to the more complex component, which is formed by the upper classes of the pre-industrial urban center. In this sense folk and urban are not polar concepts; rather, they are both integral parts of the definition of a certain type of socio-cultural unit in which the pre-industrial city is a focal point. Far from threatening the folk society, this type of urban unit is a precondition for its existence" (Foster, 1953, p. 163). Although Foster's conception is clearly akin to that of the intermediate society, it is much more limited in scope, particularly in being defined with reference to the upper classes of the *pre*indus-

trial city. The bifurcation of such a system into the folk and the upper classes is to be sure important, but I believe it would be more meaningful to think of the relationship of the folk to the city in terms of mediating institutions and functions. In its emphasis on the relationship of the folk to the dominant upper class, Foster's conception is not unlike Sjoberg's formulation of the "feudal society" which he contrasts with the folk society as delineated by Redfield (Sjoberg, 1952).

Foster's concept of the folk society, although it appears to include an urban folk component, closely resembles that of the peasant society or the peasantry as the term is usually defined. As Kroeber has written, "they [peasants] form a class segment of a larger population which usually includes also urban centers, sometimes metropolitan capitals. They constitute part-societies with part-cultures" (Kroeber, 1948, p. 284; see also Redfield, 1956). The term "peasant" has been evoked to characterize a wide variety of quite disparate societies; it has become almost the very prototype of the intermediate society. Firth (1946), for example, uses the term with reference to Malay fishermen and justifies his usage largely with reference to economic factors. Although Firth makes a good case for himself, I doubt that much is to be gained by extending so broadly a term originally referring to a societal type that emerged in Europe. In doing so one dilutes its primary meaning and runs the risk of masking important differences. Murra, writing on the Inca, whose *ayllu* communities were prime examples of intermediate societies, comments that "there is no value in attempts to classify the Inca in terms of European economic and political history. What we need is a re-examination of the evidence in the light of what anthropology has learned in recent decades, ethnographically, in the field, about preliterate but stratified societies, particularly in the Pacific and Africa. When we come to a state structure of this unusual kind, I suggest we ask some anthropological questions about the community and its relations to the state, about the creation of the necessary state revenues, and about the ideology which, in addition to coercion, made this system endure" (Murra, 1958, p. 30).

Redfield has written, "The peasant village is a half-way house, a stable structure, along the historic road mankind takes between our imagined polarities" (Redfield, 1953, p. 225). It is tempting to view peasant society, both historically and typologically, as a kind of idealized midpoint of the folk-urban continuum; and there has been a tendency for the meaning of both the folk society and the peasant society to expand to fill the conceptual vacuum between these poles.[10] However, I would agree with Wolf's suggestion that the term "peasant" be defined strictly and specifically, according to criteria for the construction of a typology of peasant groups such as he has given us (Wolf, 1955). Thus understood, peasant society would be a type of intermediate society, with its own subtypes. We might similary consider the rural proletarian community associated with the plantation as another type of intermediate society, and one quite different from the peasantry (Mintz, 1953).

In Julian Steward's frame of reference intermediate societies stand in the middle range of his levels of sociocultural integration. They are "sociocultural segments or subgroups of the population" (Steward, 1951, p. 377). However, if I may be allowed a critical aside, it seems to me that the emphasis in Steward's work falls largely on the levels of sociocultural integration as such, on emergent formal characteristics, rather than on the lines of connection between them. Steward himself calls attention to "the formal institutions . . . which constitute the bones, nerves, and sinews running throughout the total society, binding it together and affecting it at every point" (Steward, 1950, p. 115), but he does not fully explicate these connections.

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Radcliffe-Brown uses the term "composite society" to characterize newly emerging societies in Africa and elsewhere in the world. This conception has much in common with that of the intermediate society as we have described it. Radcliffe-Brown writes: "A new social structure comes into existence and then undergoes development. The population now includes a certain number of Europeans--government officials, missionaries, traders, and in some instances settlers. The social life of the region is no longer simply a process depending on the relations and interactions of the native peoples. There grows up a new political and economic structure in which the Europeans, even though few in numbers, exercise dominating influence. Europeans and Africans constitute different classes within the new structure, with different languages, different customs and modes of life, and different sets of ideas and values. A convenient term for societies of this kind would be 'composite' societies; the term 'plural' societies has also been suggested" (Radcliffe-Brown, 1952, pp. 201-2). He then goes on to cite the Union of South Africa as a complex example of a composite society with a single political and economic structure. Whether an intermediate type of society has taken form in a colonial situation in the way suggested by Radcliffe-Brown, or whether it has arisen out of an indigenous civilization is of course of great significance. As Redfield (1953, p. 227) has shown, societies that we have called intermediate can arise out of a wide variety of historical circumstances. Parenthetically, we are also led to wonder whether they are not in fact always associated, perhaps in some necessary way, with the great historical civilizations, using that term now in a Toynbeean sense.

An extended critical review of these and other conceptions of societies of the middle range would be desirable, but perhaps enough has been said to convey what is meant by the term "intermediate society," and to call attention to a few points of comparison with related concepts in common anthropological usage. We may have cast too broad a net or one with too large a mesh, but whatever terms are employed it seems to me that this recent shift of anthropological attention brings in its wake important issues of theory, of research method, and of research strategy.

Schooled in the study of tribal groups, we are confronted with something of a dilemma in turning our attention to societies of the middle range, and in seeking to understand how they relate to the greater society or tradition of which they are a part. This is a dilemma shared by many of our colleagues in the other social sciences. In two of them, economics and political science, it takes a kind of reverse twist. These disciplines are more accustomed to dealing with problems at the national rather than the grass roots level.

Our traditional methodological stance has been to face toward the community; until quite recently we have but rarely turned our backs on it and looked to the outside. As Steward has written in his critique of area research: "Most studies . . . have treated the community as if it were a primitive tribe--that is, as if it were a self-contained structural and functional whole which could be understood in terms of itself alone. Scholars are quite aware that any modern community is a functionally dependent part of a much larger whole; but in general they have not yet taken account of this larger frame of reference in community study. Individual communities are often studied as if the larger whole were simply a mosaic of such parts" (Steward, 1950, p. 22). Arensberg, in his review of community-study method, [11] grants the justice of many of Steward's strictures, noting that "much progress has been made in description in community studies, less in model building itself" (1954, p. 114). He adds, "We must also have a theory of structure accounting for both the (if only partially) isolable community itself and for the larger sociocultural

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system in which it seems to repeat itself like a separate cell in a larger organism" (*ibid.*, p. 122).

We have, I think, pretty much given up the rather naïve view of the community as the microcosm of the whole. We have been somewhat more tenacious of the idea that we can somehow arrive at a complete description of even a very complex society if we can only make enough intensive studies of representative communities and place them side by side. This view, too, is passing. Detailed community studies are of course necessary, and we have a long way to go to fill even the obvious ethnographic gaps. But such studies leave us with only a pile of building bricks; we also need the mortar, the complex lattice of connections between countryside and village, village and village, village and town, town and city, city and nation.

Although phrased with reference to India, the general question is well put by Redfield and Singer in the "Foreword" to *Village India,* the volume based on a seminar they conducted and organized: "What changes in ways to which anthropologists are accustomed when they work in isolated tribal communities are demanded when they work in a village that is part of a large society, when they study a local culture that is part and cause and product of an ancient civilization? . . . What then are anthropologists now to consider, to learn to study, to include in their widening responsibilities, when they study a village as it relates to state and to civilization?" (Marriott, editor, 1955, p. lx). These questions, which are discussed in a number of the contributions to *Village India,* are most explicitly and most cogently set forth in Marriott's paper on "Little Communities in an Indigenous Civilization."

The problems entailed in research on more complex societies may be presumed to bring anthropologists into closer alignment with sociologists, demographers, political scientists, economists, and other social scientists who have specialized in the study of such societies. And with societies of the middle range we often find documentation of a kind denied to us in studying nonliterate groups; we may also need to become historians *pro tem.* We shall doubtless increasingly borrow theory, methods, and techniques from these colleagues; presumably we shall often join forces with them in research undertakings, and we shall certainly want to use their data. However, I am not suggesting that we sell our birthright for statistics and surveys. Both can be instructive, but our distinctive research contribution and our particular strength lies in the intensive study of small groups and I assume that our work will continue to be anchored to the natural community.[12]

As Wolf (1956, p. 1065) has noted, in a complex society it is often more appropriate to view communities as the local termini of a web of group relations which extends through intermediate levels from the community to the nation. Within the community itself, Wolf observes, these relationships may be wholly tangential. In the same article he writes, "This paper constitutes an argument that we can achieve greater synthesis in the study of complex societies by focusing our attention on the relationships between different groups operating on different levels of the society, rather than on any one of the isolated segments" (*ibid.*, p. 1074). If one shares this view, as I do, the task becomes one of conceptualizing these points and lines of articulation between communities and between the community and the larger society, and the transactions among them, and of devising research methods and a research strategy appropriate to such a study and within our competence as anthropologists.

Redfield (1955, especially chapter viii, "A Community within Communities") and Marriott (1955) have reviewed a number of ways in which we can think of the relations between

the little community and the larger society. I shan't attempt even a brief recapitulation of their reviews here, rather in the space remaining I shall indicate what seem to me to be promising ways of conceiving these supralocal relationships and of studying them.

In discussing the integration of Indian civilization, Cohn and Marriott (1958) have conceptualized these relationships as networks of various kinds (of marriage, of trade, political and religious networks). They see these networks as clustering, ganglia-like, in "centers" that have various primary functions--administrative and political, commercial, religious, educational. One might go on to specify more precisely the nature of these networks and to describe the "flow" along them. The volume, direction, and changes of flow, and the relative importance of networks of different kinds may well provide, as Marriott has suggested, a useful way of comparing and distinguishing different types of communities, in this case villages and cities in India.

Another, somewhat different way of thinking about the relationships between different societal components or levels, as Wolf has suggested, [13] is in terms of the circulation between them of people, of goods and services, of power or influence, of values, of symbols, and of information. This approach suggests the interesting possibility of being able to specify and examine the *units* (e.g., people, goods, messages) that are circulated, and thus of expressing relationships between societal components in quantitative terms.

In more traditional fashion we might conceptualize these relationships in terms of social roles. Thus in his contribution to this symposium Pitkin makes a useful distinction between *national* and *local* roles. [14]

Shifting now to problems of research strategy, I should like to suggest in what appear to me to be productive lines of inquiry in the study of intermediate types of societies.

As Wolf (1956, p. 1075) has suggested, one might focus on the individuals who occupy strategic positions in the intermediate society as "brokers," or "gate-keepers"--the "hinge" groups that stand as mediators between the different levels of society. One might study the characteristics of the individuals who fill these key status positions, and their "status personalities," in Linton's phrase. One might ask whether the personnel who man these offices are recruited from within the community or from the outside as is so frequently the case in the South Italian village where the *carabinieri,* the priest, the teacher are likely to come from another region and from a different social level.

From another perspective one might study particular institutions that serve as mechanisms of social integration, as Mintz does in looking at internal markets. Taking still another point of departure, one might study other horizonal segments such as castes, social classes, sects, or voluntary associations, to see how they function as linkages between communities and between levels of society. One might look at kinship from this point of view, as Friedl (1959) has done in her study of its role in the transmission of national culture to rural villages in Greece, and as Garigue (1956) has done for French Canada. Given the questions implicit in the study of societies of the sort we have discussed, I am sure that our inventive colleagues will also easily find other ways of providing answers.

Finally, I might note that I have said little about phenomena of change as such. We all recognize that sweeping social and cultural transformations are taking place throughout the world at an unprecedented rate. Modernization, patterned after one model or another, is an explicit goal of the newly emerging states in the underdeveloped parts of the world, and this goal is reflected in the aspirations of countless villagers. It seems to me that in focusing attention on the lines of connection between the little communities of the world and outside society we have a good point of entry to study the *processes* of change as well

as the *products* of change. These are the very avenues through which changes are brought about.

<div align="right">Social Science Research Council</div>

NOTES

1. This is a somewhat revised version of the paper presented at the meeting.

2. Participants in the conference were Charles Wagley (Chairman), Conrad Arensberg, Morton Fried, Ernestine Friedl, Oscar Lewis, McKim Marriott, Donald S. Pitkin, Irwin T. Sanders, Bernard J. Siegel, Robert J. Smith, and Eric R. Wolf.

3. Fortes (1953) and Colson (1954), for example, discuss some of the problems encountered in dealing with populous African tribes.

4. It is interesting to note that the somewhat parallel concern with acculturation studies was developing during the same period, dating from the early or mid-thirties. "Memorandum on the Study of Acculturation," by R. Redfield, R. Linton, and M. J. Herskovits was published in *The American Anthropologist* in 1936.

Redfield, in his Huxley Memorial Lecture (1955, p. 25) describes social anthropology as having passed through two stages and about to enter a third. The first we might call ethnographic-historical, the second systematic-comparative, where cultures were seen as functionally or configurationally interrelated wholes. While earlier interests persist and anthropology remains a comparative science, according to Redfield, "More and more . . . we have become interested in the ways in which societies and cultures are not isolated and are not autonomous."

5. Boskoff (1953, p. 229) uses the term "transitional society" in this sense. He writes: "it is suggested that the dynamic nature of social data necessitates supplementation of these polar types with one or more intermediate types, which we may call 'transitional' types. . . . By 'transitional society' is meant a society which offers substantial evidence of modification away from some distinguishable ideal type with which it has been previously identified."

6. For "peasant community" in this passage we might read "intermediate society."

7. We may note that a number of recent meetings have been concerned with such intra-regional comparisons, and have considered many of the same issues in the study of intermediate types of societies under discussion here. A seminar was held at the University of Chicago in 1954 which led to the volume *Village India,* edited by McKim Marriott. In 1956 Lawrence Wylie organized a conference at Haverford College of persons interested in French community studies, the proceedings of which have been published, and immediately prior to the present meeting the newly established Research Institute for the Study of Man and the New York Academy of Sciences joined to sponsor a conference on Social and Cultural Pluralism in the Caribbean. Two other similar conferences are scheduled for the coming summer. In August a group of Japanese and American social scientists will meet at Stanford University to discuss urban-rural relations in Japan, and at about the same time a conference on Mediterranean studies, organized by J. A. Pitt-Rivers, will be held at Wartenstein Castle in Austria, the European headquarters of the Wenner-Gren Foundation.

8. Arensberg made this comment at the SSRC conference mentioned above.

9. As Alexander Lesser pointed out in commenting on this paper, all tribal groups (e.g., Australia and the Great Plains) can be presumed to have external relations with

their neighbors. These relationships may be quite complex, but they are between relatively self-contained, co-ordinate societies. However, the fiction of complete cultural and social autonomy persists in many ethnographic accounts.

10. Odum (1953) uses "folk" in this generic sense in a long and turgid, but occasionally suggestive article on folk sociology.

11. For a useful companion piece to Arensberg's review see Chiva (1958).

12. It should be noted that by community we mean lateral groups or "horizontal social segments" as well as local groups. We need to distinguish between the community as a "substantial reality" (as a territorial and demographic unit and center of population) and as a "socio-structural reality" (Chiva, 1958, p. 20).

13. This suggestion was made at the SSRC conference.

14. In a stimulating discussion of role Southall (1959) indicates how roles may be used to classify societies. He writes: "In principle . . . the distinctive sociological characteristics of different societies, or distinguishable segments of them, can be measured by a formula that expresses the relation between the number of persons occupying a given geographical area, the number of role relationships played by them, the narrowness and specificity of role definition, the proportion of latent role relationships, the degree of inequality in distribution, and the comparative duration over time of role relationships" (p. 28).

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SOME COMMENTS ON THE CONCEPT OF THE INTERMEDIATE SOCIETY*

Alexander Lesser

I

THERE IS of course a current practice of calling primitive society "the primitive iso-late," "self-contained," and "self-sufficient." But the usage goes back, not to the facts, but to an assumption that a primitive group is virtually a closed society and that evidence of its external relations with other societies can be discounted or disregarded as irrele-vant or unimportant.

Actually, the facts never supported this assumption of primitive isolation, and continu-ing use of the conception obscures, if it does not falsify, comparative analysis and under-standing of the nature of human society, primitive or complex.

Trade between human groups was proved long ago by archeology, even for paleolithic times. And, though some earlier anthropology assumed the primitive isolate, it turned none the less to "borrowing" and "diffusion" to explain cultural similarities among neigh-boring peoples. We cannot have it both ways. We cannot have self-contained, isolated societies on the one hand, and on the other explain culture area distributions by borrow-ing and diffusion or trace culture change and development to the influence of peoples upon one another.

Modern research has made the "primitive isolate" assumption increasingly unrealistic. Aboriginal Australia, as we now understand it, was essentially a continent-wide culture, made up of many societies, each part of a network of actual or potential relations to all others on the continent. Among the Nuer peoples any group or community is a "communi-ty within communities,"[1] linked to other and/or larger social and political structures, Nuer and non-Nuer, by defined or definable channels of relationship or communication. Or again, to take the example of precontact North America, trade channels between soci-eties, and especially between cultivating and hunting peoples, were so well established that European goods were absorbed into the interior as soon as they appeared along the eastern coasts and the St. Lawrence River.[2]

It is certainly time to discard the notion of primitive isolation, and to accept the fact that society at any level of primitivity or complexity is characterized by external rela-tions to other societies as well as by internal structured relations.

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*Ed. note: This title has been supplied by the editor. The "comments" which the paper presents were made extemporaneously at the Spring Meeting of the Society following Dr. Casagrande's paper. At the editor's request, Dr. Lesser kindly agreed to put his re-marks in writing so that they might be included in the *Proceedings*. The text is therefore not verbatim but is a faithful presentation of the substance of what was said.

The concept of "communications process" mentioned by Mr. Casagrande then becomes more useful in comparative analysis of the nature of human society. It is not a feature that is absent in primitive society and present in more complex societies, but a process that is universal to human society. The real problem is the comparative analysis of differences in the structuring and complexity of the "communications process" as we compare one society with another--primitive and primitive, primitive and more complex, modern and modern. I venture to predict that in so doing we will find a fundamental relation between the structuring of the internal and external relations of any society, and that that relation will clarify the nature of primitive society, of "intermediate" society, of modern society, or in fact of human society itself.

II

There is some relation between the notion of "the primitive isolate" and the idea that anthropological method in the study of the primitive was essentially "holistic," developed as an instrument for description of a society completely and comprehensively and as a unit. Obviously, if a primitive society is an isolated, self-contained unit, it seems more feasible to make such an attempt.

But there are two important reasons for questioning the accuracy of this description of anthropological method. For one thing, it is questionable how often if ever this kind of completeness was attempted or succeeded, and, for another, there was always present in anthropological work an alternative and different method and approach, one which was more or less comparative, concerned not with societies as wholes, but with the analysis of institutions or institutional complexes.

In this latter approach the cultural point of view meant that institutions, beliefs, customs, mores, etc. must be understood in context, and society (or culture) was the matrix within which features being studied had their being and their function.

Arensberg gives this view clear-cut sociological form in his paper on the "Community Study Method,"[3] in which he points out (1) that most community studies actually do not comprehend the whole community--whatever their authors claim--but have a more limited emphasis, focus, or problem: and (2) that the importance of the "community" concept is that of the matrix in which any social phenomena are viable.

Arensberg, in collaboration with Kimball, has also given us an illustrative model of the use of community study method in "Family and Community in Ireland."[4] Often criticized as an incomplete community study, it is not a community study at all, but community study method in operation in the analysis of features of rural Irish life relevant to the understanding of specific problems.

The importance of recognizing this *other* tradition--as expressed in "the community study method"--is that anthropology, in approaching the study of complex or modern society, is not faced with the difficulty of an older method which may not be applicable to newer problems. There are not two kinds of anthropological method, one that worked on "the primitive isolate" and another that needs to be forged for the analysis of more complex social structures. There is one fundamental method and approach of anthropology, implied by its conception of culture and society as the matrix in which social behavior and interpersonal relations take place, and it is applicable to the analysis of complex as well as simple social structures and situations. "Family and Community in Ireland" illustrates this neatly.

The use of "intermediate society" as a term, as suggested by Mr. Casagrande, seems to raise unnecessary difficulties for scientific communication and understanding. There is an ordinary meaning of "intermediate" which is discarded when an "intermediate society" is defined exclusively as a part society of a larger society, as a subsociety or subculture. Thus there are societies that would ordinarily be called "intermediate" in terms of levels of sociocultural integration, or more simply, in terms of their position on a continuum from the simplest societies at one polar extreme to the high degree of complexity of modern industrial society at the other. Trobriand, or Northwest Coast, or Ashanti, for example, would be "intermediate" in this sense, but all of these would be "primitive," along with Andaman and Bushman, in terms of the definition of "intermediate society" offered by Mr. Casagrande.

We can of course take words and make them serve as terms as we will, once they are properly defined. But the ambiguities and confusions many analysts will find in this use of "intermediate society" suggests that a better term should be offered for the type of social phenomena to which Mr. Casagrande refers.

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NOTES

1. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer* (Oxford, 1940); and R. Redfield, *The Little Community* (Chicago, 1955), chapter viii.

2. G. T. Hunt, *The Wars of the Iroquois* (Madison, Wis., 1940).

3. C. Arensberg, "The Community Study Method," *American Journal of Sociology*, LX (1954), 109-24.

4. C. M. Arensberg and S. T. Kimball, *Family and Community in Ireland* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948).

THE INTERMEDIATE SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ARTICULATION

Donald S. Pitkin

RECENTLY we have been given the concept of the intermediate society to refer to "the multifarious types of societies that stand between the self-contained tribal group or primitive isolate on one hand and the urbanized center, metropolitan community, or civilization on the other, and that as subsocieties and subcultures stand in a certain relationship to the encompassing societies and cultures."[1] Inherent in this definition are three major theoretical problems: (1) the developmental significance of "intermediacy," (2) the relative location of the intermediate society on a continuum from tribal to urban, (3) the relationship of the intermediate to the encompassing society or culture.

Considerable attention has already been given to the first and the second. Both archeologists and ethnologists have concerned themselves with the diachronic aspects of civilization, the cultural type which carries the intermediate subculture. Civilization gave birth to two new social phenomena, urbanism and peasantry, both crucial ingredients for the creation of the intermediate society. By 3, 500 B. C. (Braidwood 1958:1429) the three societal types, tribesman, peasant, and urbanite existed in some areas of the Middle Eastern world.

The second problem area has also elicited theoretical interest for some time. First the sociologist (Tönnies, Durkheim, Loomis), and then the anthropologist (Redfield), has looked at our subject matter typologically. Setting up polar models of rural and urban, several investigators (Redfield, Sjoberg, Kroeber, Foster) have seen another social type falling somewhere in between. Using the concept folk, feudal, or peasant they have attempted to delineate the attributes of such an intermediate society often with reference to the two end points. This procedure has the merit of specifying a logical relationship and on occasion an actual one, for there are some societies in which the peasant has relations with townsmen on one hand and with more primitive people on the other. But the inclusion of tribal peoples is not characteristic of civilization; therefore only logically is it necessary to consider the primitive culture in such a formulation.

The third problem area, that of the relation of the intermediate society to the encompassing whole, is the one to which the remainder of this discussion will be devoted. It has been a subject of investigation only in recent years. A part-whole relationship raises new problems for the anthropologist. Heretofore, to use Firth's terms, we have taken as our "unit of observation" and "representation" the tribal society and regarded it conceptually as an autonomous entity even if in historical fact it has not always been so. Relations with other social systems have been seen largely as contact phenomena with emphasis upon the acculturative process. But this approach handles only the fact of cultural interchange and adjustment between different social systems. Our interest lies not in deter-

mining the influence of one culture tangential to another, but rather in conceptualizing the essentially concentric attributes of the intermediate society.

This has already been attempted elsewhere. Redfield writes of the part-whole relationship, culturally, in terms of the interdependence of the great and little traditions. But he also looks at it from the point of view of social structure, as a system of persisting relations between people. I should like to pursue this latter approach further, for I am of the opinion that the most important attribute of the intermediate society is the nature of its structural articulation to the larger totality.

Unlike the self-contained tribal group the intermediate society is characterized by two role systems, one local, the other national. By this we mean simply that persons fill roles that are available to all members of the total society as well as ones that are unique to particular local settings. It is the fact that community members are also members of state, church, political party, etc. that permits us to speak of articulation. From this a number of propositions about intermediate societies can be deduced.

Our first general proposition is that, in populations where local roles are held in opposition (psychological) to national ones and/or national roles are not accessible, the "intermediate" nature of the society is strong. On the other hand, where national roles are compelling and/or are readily available the intermediate aspects of the unit of investigation are lessened. From this first we derive two additional propositions: (1) in any population being considered some members may be more closely articulated than others; and (2) changes may occur in the weighting of either local or national roles so that at time A articulation may be more firm than at time B.

A second general proposition is that intermediate societies may be either structurally remote or near depending upon the relative importance of local or national roles. We are saying, then, that articulation implies not only the process of interconnection, i.e., role activities, but also structural distance. A complex society may be viewed as a social field in which its component parts are differentially distributed. For our purposes a social field has a center and a periphery. In the social field represented by nations the center is occupied by the metropolitan community, the locus of power concentration. These centers of command serve as organizing function for the total society. Decisions made there influence the circulation of values throughout the culture as a whole. The subsocieties and subcultures that we are calling intermediate are found somewhere between the center and periphery. It should be quite clear that our spatial references are structural, not ecological.

The theoretical formulation that I have developed here has grown from an attempt to conceptualize the relationship which exists between the community of Sermoneta, in south central Italy, and Rome. I have good reason to believe, both from observation and reading, that these generalizations have applicability for all of southern and south central Italy. For our purposes, Sermoneta is being regarded as a unit example of an intermediate society and Rome a center of command. Sermoneta is located in the province of Latina, some fifteen kilometers from the provincial capital and seventy five from Rome.

Let us look first at what we mean by local and national roles in the case of Sermoneta. There are very few local roles, and by far the most important is that of the family. Banfield has incisively stated that further south in Montegrano in Lucania there is no meaningful membership other than in the nuclear family. Friends and neighbors are luxuries that the Montegranesi feel they cannot afford, and being a fellow townsman is not an important fact except possibly where outsiders are involved. With some qualification this description fits Sermoneta as well. The most popular saying in Sermoneta, "First they

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fatten you, then they slaughter you, " is indicative of the profound distrust held about others' intentions. Outside of a few friendship cliques there is no middle ground of community organizational life between family and nation. As a consequence individuals are turned in upon family roles, and there is no real social existence apart from them. Familial inversion thus sets high boundaries between family and family, family and community, and family and nation. But these boundaries of which we speak are not only responses to centripetal forces operating within the family, but are also due to problems inherent in the filling of national roles.

As we have noted above, national roles provide the conceptual articulation of the intermediate subsociety. It is the fact that persons are Italians, taxpayers, soldiers, Catholics, Communists, monarchists as well as Raponis, Colluzzis, and Rossis that makes Sermoneta a part of the larger whole. But local roles are particularistic and utilize unique referents that are potentially divisive within the total culture especially when they stand in opposition to larger spheres of membership. National roles, on the other hand, utilize universal referents and therefore have an integrating effect. In Sermoneta, however, as in the rest of this part of Italy, the integrating effect is minimized. Let us look at a number of them to understand why this may be so.

The most inclusive is that of citizenship. Its importance should not be overlooked, for it represents the defining attribute of the intermediate society, political dependence. For administrative purposes all Sermonetani are citizens of three concentric systems: the commune, the province, and the republic. Contingent upon this status are a number of other linked roles, those of taxpayer, soldier and student. Psychologically these are regarded as alien by most Sermonetani rather than as culturally central to community life. Alienation does not follow just from the nature of the roles themselves but rather from the perception of them as imposed, rather than emergent from local needs. Alienation from national roles and commitment to local ones constitutes the degree of imbalance that, as we suggested in our first general proposition, characterizes the intermediate society. Let us for instance consider the student. The specifications of student and the organizational apparatus by which education is achieved are determined ultimately by the Ministry of Education in Rome working through the provincial office in Latina and the local teachers who are employees of the ministry. Neither parents nor other local citizens have any significant voice in determining scholastic standards, formulating curriculum, hiring or firing personnel, or the establishment of an educational philosophy. Availability of local organizational means by which this could be done are lacking. The teachers are not, with one exception, native to the town but are assigned there for a certain tour of duty, hopefully not permanent. They are representatives of urban middle-class culture. Most Sermonetani are peasants. Social distance of this magnitude impedes interaction. The school, in fact, belongs to the government in Rome and in essence to the teachers, not to Sermoneta or to the parents.

School is not unimportant to the children of Sermoneta, but it is significant that the majority drop out at the end of the third grade to assume familial work responsibilities. Because of this traditionally premature termination of studies many Sermonetani lack the requisite sophistication to fill effectively other national roles. Significant organizational participation in the army, the church, the civil service goes to those who have been able to receive a much more intensive education than is possible for most Sermonetani. The educational system itself, like other bureaucratized organizations of national scope, may be seen as having central and peripheral areas which complement and reinforce similar areas in the society as a whole. Inability to move toward the center of the system makes

it impossible to move toward the center of national life. It is this relationship between national role and national centrality that we are considering in our second general proposition when we state that articulation refers not only to the process of interconnection but also to structural distance. From the point of view of Sermoneta we may see the student occupying a marginal position within the total social system in contrast to his highly central location in urban middle-class culture. Conversely most Sermonetani are in a peripheral position in respect to this area of national life.

As our first derived proposition we stated that some persons in the community fill national roles more fully than others and thus could be seen as more completely articulated to the encompassing culture. A brief examination of the economy provides an illustration of this. In a subsistence economy role systems involving production and consumption are defined in terms of familial and local needs and expectations with a consequent lessening of dependence upon the national economy. Some Sermonetani function on this basis, stimulating a minimal circulation of goods and services to and from the market. But most are not of this pure peasant category either because, although agriculturists, they do not have direct access to land or because, not being agriculturists, they are more fully tied to the national cash economy. The former, dependent upon seasonal and market conditions, move in and out of the producer role. Changes in the consumer role follow upon that of producer. When there is cash in hand either from the sale of labor or from produce, one purchases goods in the local or provincial market. If there is no work, the Sermonetano resorts to whatever means are available to maintain himself and his family, doing odd jobs in return for food, gleaning the harvested fields, collecting firewood in the hills behind the village. Thus, while his status as consumer is sometimes defined in terms of national ideals and satisfied by nationally produced goods, at other times it is locally phrased.

Such role discontinuity is not so prevalent among the nonagricultural segment of the population. For the salaried worker in industry or civil service, seasonal variation is of little consequence and job security is considerable. We may say that for him articulation to the national economy is firm. But, as we have pointed out, most Sermonetani neither are salaried employees nor have direct access to means of production. They are dependent upon others, landowner and entrepreneur, who are in more direct contact with the national economy. The degree to which the Sermonetani is tied in with this system depends upon his relationship to his employers. But the Southern employer has never been obligated to assume more than minimal responsibility for his workers. Furthermore capital is scarce, there is little tradition of capital investment and credit facilities are few. Contractions in the market and a slack season mean unemployment. Static economic conditions hold many Sermonetani immobilized and chronically depressed. The fact that economically some segments of the population are more directly involved in the market will not permit us the imagery of a uniformly placed community. Obviously Sermoneta is differentially distributed structurally in respect to the organizing centers of command.

Our second and final derived proposition is that the saliency of local and national roles varies in time so that on some occasions local inhabitants may be seen as more fully articulated and thus closer to the national society than at others. A brief discussion of religious roles provides an illustration of this. Nearly all Sermonetani are members of one of the parishes and of the Diocese of Terracina and of the Church Universal centered in Rome. Being Catholic as well as Italian brings the Sermonetano, at least nominally, into the national fold. But here the priest assumes a position vis-à-vis the parishioner and church similar to that of the teacher to the student and the school. The priest through

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authority from Rome and the bishop controls the local church. He holds the property by which the church is supported, administers the religious organizations affiliated to the parish and gives or denies the holy sacraments. One consequence of his strong grip upon local matters is a powerful anticlerical sentiment. The more the church attempts to embrace its parishioners, the more it alienates many of them. Such continuous and profound resentment operates to move persons away from priest, bishop, and Rome, all perceived as manipulators of secular and private affairs.

Religion is more compelling for some than it is for others. Women outnumber men three to one in church. They dominate the religious processions and assume most initiative in organizing pilgrimages to Rome and elsewhere. In fact it may be argued that it is just this compliance with the religious role on the part of the women that fans the resentment of the men against the priest. Also members of the middle class are more apt to participate in such national organizations as the Catholic Action than is the peasant who adheres more thoroughly to the cultism of local saints.

But Catholicism also varies according to situation. Even the Communists and Nenni-Socialists admit to their Catholic heritage on Christmas and Easter, and almost all men regardless of political views, expect to receive the basic sacraments for themselves and their families as a kind of given right. I am suggesting, then, that this link to Rome may alternately attract and repel. On high feast days the most virulent anticlerical may be found walking piously in the procession or helping to carry the sacred figure of the saint whose day is being celebrated. But, when the priest suggests to the unemployed in the piazza that their rewards will be duly granted in the next world, the church and all its works are damned. On Christmas Eve, when the churches are full, Sermoneta is near to spiritual Rome, but during the elections, when the priest demands a Christian Democrat vote or excommunication, the crowds of angry men in the piazza symbolize distance.

We have focused on that phrase in the definition of the intermediate society which describes it as a subsociety or subculture that stands in a *certain relationship* to the encompassing societies or cultures. We have attempted to explain what this certain relationship is. To us it is a social structural one, that is, the social structure of the intermediate society must have within it the means for articulation. This we may see very readily when we think in terms of local and national roles. It is the actualization of national roles that tie in the intermediate society with the encompassing whole. From this follows the proposition that, where local roles are especially compelling or are chosen in opposition to national ones, intermediate aspects become maximized. Such a conceptualization will permit us to avoid the need to identify an intermediate society in terms of its cultural content. Furthermore, the dialectic of local and national helps us to appreciate that the degree of articulation varies throughout the population under consideration, and also through time.

I have further suggested that implied in the part-whole relationship is the matter of structural distance. To help us think spatially I have employed simplified topological constructs of centrality and peripherality. In complex societies we have noted that the center is occupied by the metropolitan community and that the intermediate society stands somewhere between the center and the margin. Its degree of centrality or marginality is dependent upon the relative salience of national or local roles.

Finally these propositions have been examined in regard to the Italian community of Sermoneta, in which local roles are few but the familial one is extremely compelling and turns the individual in upon the family and away from community and nation. At the same time national roles are seen as imposed, and barriers to their fulfillment are raised by

members of the elite, the *autorità*. Consequently we have described Sermoneta as being marginal to a number of institutionalized areas of Italian life.

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NOTE

1. We are indebted to J. B. Casagrande for this definition. Dr. Casagrande formulated it for a S.S.R.C. meeting on the intermediate society held in New York City in October, 1958.

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INTERNAL MARKET SYSTEMS AS MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL ARTICULATION[1]

Sidney W. Mintz

MARKETS are mechanisms to facilitate the exchange of goods and services. As such, the presence of markets defines nonself-sufficiency. Market places are the loci where concrete exchanges take place. They facilitate the sale and acquisition of goods and services not as easily obtainable, or not obtainable at all, within a smaller social circle or unit. When a society possesses an organized framework for the conduct of economic exchanges --customary centers of exchange with their aggregates of buyers and sellers, a calendar of market days, and other features giving exchanges regularity and a predictable form-- it possesses an internal marketing system.

By "articulation" is meant here simply "relationship." Different segments of a single society--classes, castes, occupational groups, and the like--are related or interactive through institutional means, one of which is the set of economic practices that ensure and maintain production and distribution. The market mechanism, as part of the economic structure, operates in this way among others. Where the market system is subject to custom, ritual, hereditary assignment of position, fixed price regulation, and like considerations, it may play an important part in articulating different social and economic groups, but that part will be circumscribed by the norms prescribing behavior for group members. Such are the situations which Polanyi is describing when he writes of societies in which the economic system is embedded in the social, political, and religious framework, and the free movement of labor, land, capital, and commodities is sharply restricted.[2] In these situations the market system cannot change quickly, or serve different forms of articulation, until it begins to be shaken loose from its traditional social context. Internal exchange systems with markets, but carefully checked by law and custom, include the fairs of medieval Europe and the great markets of West Africa of several centuries ago.[3] Royal monopolies, regulated prices, heavily ritualized exchanges, separate internal and foreign trade circles, and different markets for royalty and commoners are some of the diagnostic characteristics of "unfree" market systems. Freeing a market system from traditional and ritual bonds may hold the potentiality of conflict between social groups. But, in any case, any new articulations an internal market system may serve cannot emerge until the market is at least partly free from traditional social, religious, and other restrictions.

"Peasant society," as used here, refers to a wide variety of social systems, all of which possess substantial numbers of small-scale landholders who produce crops for sale as well as for consumption, and who are subject to some degree of outside control. These peasantries, in Wolf's view, aim at a culturally standardized level of life, rather than at continuously expanded production.[4] As Redfield made clear, peasantries are sub-

ject to controls wielded by the state, and their position within their respective whole societies is defined by outside forces, symbolized by the city.[5] Though these terms of reference will surely be refined and revised in the future, they probably hold for such societies as Haiti, Jamaica, Guatemala, and Mexico, whose internal market systems will serve as illustrations here. In two of these societies, the internal market systems were pre-Columbian in origin, and their early character has not been satisfactorily established. In the other two societies, the internal market systems were created as adjuncts to the institutions of slavery and the plantation and continued to function as internal economic mechanisms after the end of slavery in Jamaica, and after the end of slavery and the plantation in Haiti. In all four cases, the internal market systems today are typified generally by the relatively free movement of goods, services, buyers and sellers, and prices. An attempt will be made here to show that the articulation provided by these systems is subject to some changes originating in the distributive process itself, to the extent that economic activity is indeed free. At the same time, it will be clear that the kind and amount of change that can occur are limited by economic forces outside the internal market system and by the power of the state. Since detailed comparisons of internal market systems must await the gathering of data of special kinds, more time must be spent here in raising questions about the "anatomy" of these systems than in process analysis of such systems as mechanisms of articulation.

To begin with, in societies marked by economic and social differentiation, the exchange of goods and services through the market system may occur as between class equals who fill different productive roles, or as between classes, which vary not only in their productive roles, but also in their group access to wealth and capital, social status, and political power. Where the exchange of goods and services ends in their consumption by class equals, it may be called "horizontal exchange." Where the exchange of goods and services ends in their consumption by members of a class different from that of their producers, it may be called "vertical exchange." A related and derived distinction will have to be made as to the class position of the intermediaries who participate in such exchanges. The distributive process may involve the movement of goods through the hands of intermediaries who differ in their class position from the producers, from the consumers, or both. Finally, a distinction must be made between "upward" and "downward" vertical exchange. Imports and trade goods, for instance, which pass from the importer, wholesaler, or factory owner to the peasantry illustrate downward vertical exchange; fresh vegetables and craft goods which pass from the peasantry to the middle classes and bureaucracy illustrate upward vertical exchange.

Either horizontal or vertical exchange can occur without a fixed medium of exchange or standard of value. But exchange is more often expedited by the use of some standard unit, and, in most contemporary internal market systems, these units take the form of a national currency. Exchange in market places through the use of money is typical of all peasant marketing systems in the New World today[6]--as in the case of Mexico, Guatemala, Jamaica, or Haiti--and probably of the vast majority of marketing systems in peasant societies the world over. Exceptions in contemporary New World systems, as in parts of Guatemala and the Andean highlands, are of interest today mainly because they are uncommon and because they appear to be steadily diminishing.

It is not possible to estimate precisely what percentage by value of the produce which passes through the internal markets of countries such as Haiti and Jamaica is consumed by members of the same class as the producers. The figure surely exceeds one-half in each instance. In many cases, the peasantry of a region must sell off part of what it

needs immediately.[7] Subsequently the same individuals may buy back the same items they sold earlier, usually at a higher price. The market in these instances is serving a combined storage-and-credit function. The market's usefulness in this connection is related to the peasant's limited means of storage, his chronic shortage of liquid capital, and perhaps to his culturally standardized preference for buying needed goods often and in small quantities.[8] But of course these are not the only reasons for horizontal exchange. Such exchange is supported by regional variation in the supply of handicraft materials and the attached variation in craft tradition; by variation in altitude, climate, soil type, and growing season; and by the presence of consumption standards which preclude local self-sufficiency and may come to undermine it increasingly.

Upward vertical exchange in the market places of the four societies named earlier serves principally to supply nonagricultural producers of a higher class position with a few specialized products. Most important here are agricultural items, especially perishable foods, which the peasantry supplies for the cuisines of the town dwellers, middle classes, and tourists of these nations. Less important are the utilitarian objects such as brooms, baskets, mats, and minor tinware, ceramic, or leather articles. More often these items are "folk art," including the woven cloth and clothing of Guatemala and Mexico, the drums and mahogany craft of Haiti, and the basketry and jippi-jappa products of Jamaica. An important aspect of upward vertical exchange is the extent to which the products it comprises are consumed exclusively by a class different from that of the producers. Even with regard to foodstuffs, there are few indeed which are consumed in common by both peasantry and other classes.

But vertical exchange proceeds downwardly as well as upwardly. The consumption norms of the peasantry include not only regionally and seasonally differentiated products, but also some particular essentials manufactured only in urban centers or abroad. The extent to which this downward movement takes place through the internal marketing system varies. To some degree at least the channels of movement are determined by national legislation and its enforcement, as well as by established custom. In Haiti, there are very few items a peasant must buy in a store. Cloth, clothing, agricultural tools, needles and thread, cooking oil, fuel, cooking utensils, foreign spices, bread made with imported flour, even common medicinals and nearly everything else that the peasant needs which originates in the city or abroad can be purchased in the market place. In the case of Jamaica, however, all of these items are usually obtainable only in stores. Arbitrary or customary limitation of the market place to the sale of particular products restricts the entry of new intermediaries and inhibits the growth of the market place itself as a locus of economic activity. Insistence that certain products be sold only in stores, and/or with particular licenses, further limits the growth of new groups of intermediaries. Hence any such limitations are relevant to an examination of the internal market as a mechanism of social articulation.[9]

At the same time that the internal market system must be viewed in terms of the kinds of exchange which can take place within it, those trade channels which circumvent or fail to make use of the internal market places must also be noted. Such are the special media designed to bulk, process, grade, and move the major world market crops produced by the peasantry. In the case of Guatemalan coffee and bananas, Jamaican sugar, and Haitian sisal to a large degree, the peasant participates only to the extent of selling his labor. But in the case of Haitian coffee and cotton, Jamaican pimento, and Jamaican bananas to a considerable degree, the peasant produces world market crops on his own land, yet they are marketed through specially designed means and special intermediaries. Of

course small quantities of cotton and coffee and sisal will be found in Haitian market places, and ripe bananas in Jamaican market places. But it is expressly because these products do not qualify for export and are being marketed for horizontal exchange and local consumption that they are found in the market places at all. Thus at least one very important category of rural intermediary functions outside the internal marketing system in these countries.[10] Where downward vertical exchange of certain products is expressly forbidden in the markets, there are two such categories of exchange and their accompanying intermediaries, with different social positions and functions, outside the internal marketing system.

The professional intermediaries who carry on their activities in the market places function in several ways which differ in economic meaning: they may bulk produce, transport it, store it, process it, and break bulk for retailing. In Haiti, the middlemen carry on all of these activities and may also serve as credit sources or bankers. And it is of more than passing interest that, in two of the four societies mentioned at least, almost all intermediaries are women. One of the possible implications of this division of labor may be examined here. In Jamaica and Haiti, and possibly in Guatemala and Mexico as well, there appears to be some discontinuity, or lack of fit, between the productive and distributive sectors of the peasant economy. The arguments which favor the concept of the "dual economy" seem to lose much of their force when applied to these countries.[11] But the difference suggested here between production and distribution may have some utility. In the societies mentioned, it is the productive sector of the peasant economy which seems to exhibit more conservatism, nonexpansiveness, traditional technique, and less firmly rooted market orientation.[12] In contrast, the distributive sector, as represented in large part by the internal market system, appears to be more open to change, more expansive, and more resilient. This is doubtless due in part to the fact that distributive intermediaries have more maneuverability in their dealings than peasant producers. But, further, the nature of internal marketing activity exposes the distributors to more potential innovations, and educates them in economic resourcefulness, in a way that peasant production cannot. Since the marketers in Jamaica and Haiti are almost exclusively women, the implications of the differences between production and distribution among the peasantry have a special sociological, as well as economic, meaning. Wolf has suggested[13] that the delegation of the middleman role to the woman in these societies involves her in an entirely different risk structure, as he puts it, demanding a different economic orientation. In this connection, it is important that the woman's commercial activities do not permit her to commit heavily the economic effort or resources of her peasant producer husband; she acquires her stock normally from a great many individual sellers. The only commitment she might exact from her husband is some part of the original capital she needs to initiate her business. Though her marketing activity reduces the labor contribution she is able to make to the cultivation of her and her husband's land, it is of interest that this is of limited importance in the peasant production patterns of Jamaica and Haiti.

The preceding presentation enumerates certain general characteristics relating to the economies of peasant societies, with special reference to their systems of internal exchange. Though they surely do not hold for all cases, they are probably valid for Haiti, Jamaica, Guatemala, and perhaps Mexico. The characteristics are:

1. Internal market systems, as defined earlier.
2. The use of a national currency in most internal marketing transactions.

3. A horizontal flow of goods among class equals through the internal marketing systems, probably accounting for well over half of all internal marketing activity.

4. A vertical and downward flow of manufactured goods and imports, only partly through these systems.

5. A vertical and upward flow of staples, perishables, and craft items, mainly through these systems.

6. An outward flow of staples for the world market, moving only through special channels.

7. Numerous intermediaries within the marketing system, who facilitate economic activity in the market places by performing bulking, storing, transport, processing, and bulk-breaking services, and serving as credit sources as well. In two of the cases mentioned, almost all intermediaries are women.

8. An economic division or discontinuity in that peasant production may be more conservative and traditional, and less fully capitalistic, while peasant marketing inclines to be open to change, and more capitalistic in ideology and practice.

To these eight characteristics must now be added a ninth, which is of some significance here but which defies easy treatment. There is little if any evidence of deliberate price control on the part of sellers in the internal markets of the societies named earlier. Nor is there any evidence of price-fixing from above, that is, by government fiat, for those products which are sold in the internal markets. To the extent that such statements hold true, the prices of produce flowing through the internal markets of these countries are a continuous expression of the relation of supply and demand. There are exceptions, but on the local level, at least, the absence of externally imposed standards of price, or of monopolies or price-fixing combinations, is revealing. In economic terms these markets are typified by competition which is nearly perfect, as Foster has suggested for Mexico, [14] the writer for Jamaica, [15] and Métraux and his coworkers have implied for Haiti. [16]

It does not follow, however, that there are no examples of so-called "noneconomic" forces at work within them. If the tendency of earlier observers of these systems was to overemphasize such noneconomic forces, surely the pendulum has now swung the other way. [17] What seems true is that there is an important personal element in the conduct of internal marketing activity in these societies. The nature of this economic personalism may be elucidated as follows. Produce which reaches the internal markets is not usually bulked in great quantities but moves instead in small lots. Only a small (though economically important) number of intermediaries bulk and transport large quantities of a few items for the internal market. The movement of human beings, by weight, may exceed the movement of produce itself in these systems. Purchases are small, and each load of goods is customarily accompanied by a selling intermediary. Most middlemen carry stocks which are diversified as well as small in quantity, so that the distributive pattern in this regard seems to parallel the peasant productive pattern. Exchange is frequent, and the same sellers generally follow a yearly round of activity, returning to the same places with the same stock, season by season, and buying from the same sources. These circumstances apparently lead to the creation of large numbers of personal relationships between sellers and sellers, and buyers and sellers. Behind the operation of supply and demand, then, there is a network of person-to-person dealings which persist over time and outlast any single transactions. And along with the near-perfect competition which determines price in relation to supply and demand, there is slight but significant variation in the quantities given particular buyers, extension of credit, and the dispensing of

other services, which tie particular intermediaries and their customers together. This personalistic background is not remarkable, and there are important parallels even in highly industrialized countries. But in the internal marketing systems of peasant societies, these small distinctions based on personal relationships loom more importantly. It needs emphasizing that, if this picture is wholly correct, it in no way contradicts the now common assertion that marketers in these societies have fully developed commercial motivations. In fact, the use of personalism in their transactions is economically sound and simply reflects awareness of the general social and economic characteristics of the societies in which they carry on their activities. The ninth point, then, would be: a price system based largely on the operation of supply and demand but backed up by a strong personalistic element which affects the nature of internal marketing activity.

These nine points provide a crude introduction to the viewing of internal marketing systems as systems. Something may be added here as to the way such systems serve as mechanisms of social articulation. The internal marketing system provides a focus of convergence of the interests of social and economic classes and their representatives. As such, it may afford a ladder of upward economic mobility for members of different groups. It can also serve as a device for the commercial exploitation of one class by another. The market system may serve to level classes, or to make class levels more distinct. Moreover, through the manipulation of the market structure, the state may be able to interfere in the class balance. In sum, internal market systems are more than mechanisms for exchange; they are as well part of the national institutional structure. Since this is so, changes within them or imposed upon them may have repercussions reaching far beyond their immediate economic effects. In the societies referred to earlier, the internal marketing systems are typified by relatively free movement of goods, services, and the people who deal in them. This freedom is symbolized by the sensitivity of prices to changes in the relationship of supply and demand, and by the relatively easy entry of new intermediaries filling new roles in the marketing chain whenever the chance of profit appears. Yet the internal markets are not the means for bulking and eventual exportation of world market staples, and only partly for the distribution of imports and manufactures essential to the daily life of the peasantry. Thus, two of the most important channels by which the articulation of different social and economic segments can be perceived have been largely set apart from the internal marketing system. This separation is partly a measure of the control wielded by the state power over the economic activity of the peasantry. Through control of licenses and permits, through decisions as to the number of intermediaries, and by other means, the state channels the movement of certain products outside the internal marketing system to serve its own ends and those of the classes which control it. [18] This potentially conflictful articulation is revealed not by the operation of the internal marketing system itself, but by the marketing media set up outside that system.

At the same time, the internal markets continue to be the means by which the peasantry supplements its cash income from wage labor and from the production of staples for the world market. And to this extent the internal markets can and do reveal a different conflictful articulation of some importance. This may be clearer in the case of Haiti than in the other societies mentioned. Coffee, essential oil plants, sisal, and, formerly, cotton and bananas, constitute the major export crops; all but sisal are produced mainly by the peasantry. In terms of cultivated area or labor invested, however, probably none singly or even all together can compete with the food crops--millet, rice, maize, roots, legumes, etc.--which the peasantry produces for consumption and for sale in the local

markets. The sale of food for consumption within Haiti itself, then, constitutes a major alternative source of cash for the peasantry. No peasant commits his land and labor entirely to the production of coffee, or to the production of coffee and subsistence alone, and government programs to increase coffee production have never succeeded spectacularly. The peasantry continues to depend heavily upon its production of crops which may be sold locally and eaten. Accordingly, it may be correct to argue that the internal markets are the peasantry's first line of defense--after subsistence--against a deeper commitment to the production of world market staples. The way pressure may be applied to push up the production of world market staples may vary. Where such staples are produced on large-scale holdings, forced labor laws may be used, as they were for many years in Guatemala.[19] Taxes of various sorts to compel small-scale subsistence cultivators to turn part of their productive effort toward export staples, or to force them into wage labor on estates, are also familiar. But in situations where the peasantry already produces world market staples on its own lands such measures are not always practicable. Instead, production may be increased by price supports, subsidies, lowered export taxes, and so on, so that the peasantry receives more for its effort and for the yield of its lands. Attempts may also be made to force up production by penalties of various kinds: taxation used as punishment for failure to produce export crops, differential land taxes, import tariffs which turn the terms of trade against the peasant, and so on. Whether the techniques used are encouragements in the form of a greater cash reward, or in the form of goads to production, is of course highly important; but in either case the connection between production for the world market and production for subsistence and the internal markets is a real and important one. The details of this relationship vary in many regards, and these need to be explored in the case of each peasant society studied. But the relationship itself highlights the role of the internal marketing system as a stage for the acting out of class interest.

For the peasant producer of world market staples, the effort he puts into production and the reward he receives for it can sometimes seem to be connected in quixotic fashion; this is true particularly when the price of his product is subject to sharp and unexpected oscillation, and when government levies on the value of his product vary suddenly and significantly. The connection between effort and the reward he receives for the production of subsistence crops, and of those he may sell locally, must seem more reasonable--and in terms of market behavior perhaps it is. The role of government in affecting his success with export crops seems powerful; its role in affecting his success with crops for the internal markets is less striking. When the money yield to the peasant from world market crops is high, the price of food may rise, and vice versa--though this is by no means an invariable relationship. Where the relationship does hold, it may mean that the increased production of world market crops is accompanied by a decline in the production of food crops.[20] And where this or its opposite does occur, world market crop production and food production are rivalrous with the economy. In such instances, the differences in objective between government and peasantry are to some extent exposed. The internal markets, which provide the peasantry with a modicum of cash especially when export crops yield little, may thus become a setting for a strange, half-concealed struggle affecting the entire social system of a peasant country. This struggle may be all the stranger by virtue of the cultural values, the stereotypes of peasant ignorance and inertia, and the faulty communication between the peasantry and representatives of other classes which it involves. Though this formulation is as yet largely hypothetical, there is nothing hypothetical in the assertion that the peasantry may neglect its world market

crops, even turning its lands more heavily to local food crops, when the reward for world market crops declines sharply. And a decline of this sort need not originate only in world market conditions; it could originate in the tax system of the country itself.

Only in recent years have the governments of peasant countries begun dimly to perceive that internal marketing systems are more than picturesque means for the peasant or his wife to while away idle hours. That such markets did provide an admirable setting for taxation, however, was long known. In Haiti today, for instance, the market woman is taxed for tethering her beast; for butchering a pig, sheep, goat or cow; for the stand on which pork is displayed for sale; for the grass roof beneath which wares are spread; and for the assessed values of the wares themselves; not to mention the license fees which are paid to permit dealing in certain products. Selling must not take place outside the market limits; resellers who buy within these limits are taxed for what they buy. Attempts have even been made by past governments to suppress many rural markets in order to concentrate activity in urban centers, [21] and townsmen have circulated petitions for the crushing of rural markets. [22] Though interventions of this sort, particularly in the form of taxation, affect market prices, they probably have not seriously affected the volume of internal trade. Whereas a sharp increase in taxation upon coffee production or a sharp drop in world market prices may affect such production in the subsequent year, it is much less likely that the taxes incident to local marketing operations affect the amount of internal market trade. On the basis of these assertions, it may be claimed further that the articulation of classes represented by the channels for the purchase and resale of world market crops is more rigid and more clearly defined than that afforded by the internal marketing system. The internal marketing system may, so to speak, allow for more "play" at present.

Only brief mention has been made so far of the intermediaries in internal marketing systems. Such middlemen stand between producer and consumer in the marketing chain, whether the exchange is proceeding horizontally or vertically. Hence they play a central role in the articulation of the peasantry with other classes, and of different segments of the peasantry with each other. Of course some trade proceeds without the intervention of middlemen. The wives of peasants who carry only a handful of produce to market in order to get cash to fill minor but immediate needs are numerically very important. Resident craftsmen, such as tinkers and sandal makers--and these are males--may sell their own handicrafts in the market places. And one small category of craftsmen, specializing in tourist items, sells its wares directly to elegant curio and "folk art" shops or directly to tourists, thus circumventing the internal marketing system entirely. (In its most rarefied form, this channel is represented by the artists and sculptors of Haiti and the silver workers of Mexico--but, in both cases, new varieties of mainly foreign intermediaries have found a profitable niche.)

But the bulk of peasant production moves through the internal markets and through the hands of intermediaries. Such intermediaries do not form a homogeneous group, any more than do the peasantry or the people of the cities. They vary from extremely poor middlemen, who sell small quantities of cooked food in the market places, to relatively wealthy rural and urban resellers and semiwholesalers, who bulk fairly substantial quantities of a few staple items, selling to internal market retailers in other centers. Since this variety of intermediaries does not form a homogeneous economic group, there is no reason to suppose that it is homogeneous socially or politically.

Of special importance in the present discussion are three categories of resellers. There are the city retailers, who reside in the capital or in provincial cities, maintain-

ing regular booths in the market places, buying their produce wholesale, and retailing it to local consumers of all classes. These retailers form a potent political group with interests divergent from those both of their customers and of those who sell to them. And there are the two categories of itinerant resellers, who may reside in the city or in the countryside, dealing in wholesale stock, buying in the country to sell in the city, or the opposite, or doing both. These resellers form what are perhaps the most significant categories of intermediary, insofar as the market as a mechanism of social articulation is concerned. In the scale of their operations, and in the amount of capital they possess, such intermediaries may be as substantial as small storekeepers, and in some cases may even exceed them. But their social position is almost certain to be below that of the *petit bourgeois*. Since many of these intermediaries live in rural areas, come from peasant families, or have persisting roots in the country, their interests may be connected to some extent with the peasantry. Yet the nature of their operations may just as well contrapose them against the countryside. That is, they may be peasants in culture while their economic operations align them with the urban bourgeoisie. Though these intermediaries have not emerged so dramatically within the internal marketing systems of the New World as have the "market mammies" of Ghana, the potentiality for this emergence may be present.

Lack of space compels the omission of several other points which could be explored in preliminary fashion. Major emphasis has been restricted here to a description of internal market systems as mechanisms, with but secondary attention to the way such mechanisms can express integration or conflict among various economic and social groupings within the society at large. To the extent that economic behavior in the market place is free of restrictions, the market system may serve to galvanize or consolidate new economic groupings and to permit the vested economic interests of different groups to play themselves out. Our lack of sufficient detailed information on the functioning of internal market systems precludes any satisfactory comparative analysis now. Perhaps at least some of the sorts of information that are needed will have been suggested in the present paper.

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NOTES

2. Polanyi, 1944, pp. 56-76. Polanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson, 1957, pp. 243-70.

3. For medieval Europe, see for instance Heilbroner, 1953, pp. 9-32. For West Africa, see for instance Herskovits, 1952, pp. 217-21.

4. Wolf, 1955, pp. 452-71.

5. Redfield, 1953, pp. 26-41.

6. The writer has had one instance of barter brought to his attention in Jamaica. There is some barter, even in market places, still occurring in Guatemala. According to Pro-

fessor John Murra (personal communication), there are Andean markets operating today still characterized almost exclusively by barter.

7. This was first noted in print in the case of Haiti by M. Edouard Berrouet, See Métraux *et al.*, 1951, pp. 2-3.

8. The term "withholding power," devised by Lauriston Sharp to describe the Thai peasant's capacity to store produce rather than being forced to sell off in order to acquire liquid capital or other goods, is very apt. See Sharp, Hauck, *et al.*, 1953.

9. This is of course not to say that such limitations are unreasonable or unnecessary. Each such restriction has to be judged according to its merits. In all cases, however, these restrictions do shape the course of economic activity in particular ways.

10. Professor Gates has pointed out to the writer that the intermediaries who handle export commodities such as cotton and coffee in Haiti are usually numerous, locate their buying centers in the same villages, and are faced by crowds of peasant sellers, such that the mode of transaction is analogous to what occurs in the market places. In spite of this, the social character of specialized intermediaries and the role of government in licensing their activities set this aspect of marketing distinctly apart from the internal marketing system.

11. See for instance Mosk, 1954, pp. 3-26.

12. In this connection, see for instance Myint, 1958, pp. 328-29.

13. Personal correspondence.

14. Foster, 1948, pp. 153-62.

15. Mintz, 1956, pp. 18-23.

16. Métraux *et al.*, 1951, p. 125.

17. See for instance Mosk, 1954, and Tax, 1953, especially pp. 204-5.

18. This argument is easily overstated, however. In the case of Haiti, there seem to be hardly any restrictions on the sale of licenses for specialized intermediaries. Such intermediaries exercise not the slightest monopolistic control, and in fact compete for sellers, so far as could be determined.

19. See for instance Jones, 1940.

20. Myint, in the work cited, points out that, where surplus productive capacity is present in peasant societies, the production of cash export crops may be undertaken without any diminution in the production of subsistence. However, if a peasant society is producing at nearly top capacity and its production for export is increased without any improvement in technique, it is obvious that production for subsistence will barely remain constant and may even decline. Contrariwise, Myint indicates that in areas of heavy population concentration, such as Indonesia (especially Java and Madura) and Fiji, subsistence production has actually been expanding at the cost of plantation agriculture. He does not find this occurring in the West Indies, but, in matter of fact, Haiti may well be a case in point.

21. Métraux *et al.*, 1951, p. 118.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

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SOME CULTURAL CORRELATES OF THE CYCLICAL MARKET

Sydel F. Silverman

THE CYCLICAL market is a phenomenon of a number of cultures throughout the world. The term refers to a system of markets in which each of a number of separate, scattered communities holds a fixed, periodic market, such as a weekly market on a particular day of the week, with the market days of all nearby communities being staggered so as to conflict as little as possible. Any group of staggered periodic markets attended by buyers and sellers within a certain radius may be considered a market cycle. This paper proposes that the cyclical market may be regarded as a particular type of market, and it examines three specific instances of the type.

The existence of this distinctive pattern in several historically nonrelated areas suggests the question of whether there are corresponding similarities in other aspects of those cultures which might be functionally related to the market system. The economy, political organization, and values of three cultures possessing a cyclical market system are considered to see whether such regularities can be discerned.

There is no implication here of a determinism or even of a priority of the market system. The underlying assumption is that various aspects of culture are interwoven so that among cultures sharing some important feature variations in certain other features would occur only within limits. The "correlates" to be mentioned are intended merely as a hypothesis of some of the features which might be so related to the cyclical market.

The three cultures selected--all of which have highly developed cyclical market systems--are the Maya of Highland Guatemala, the Berber of the Moroccan Atlas, and Dahomey of West Africa. Specific cultural content in these three areas is of course vastly different. Nevertheless, comparison reveals considerable similarity of form among them in economy, polity, and values.

I

The cyclical market is related to a settlement pattern in which communities are scattered across open country in a generally radial arrangement, near enough to each other to be within a day's travel, yet not so near as to make the periodic market unnecessary. Each of the communities has its own economic specialties, and the market is an expression of their economic interdependence. The social unit sharing a specialty will be referred to as a "section." In Guatemala, the section is the *municipio;* among the Berbers it is the village; and in Dahomey it is the village, the quarter, or the guild.

The economy of the three cultures may be described in terms of the following model. There are a number of discrete sections which articulate with each other by means of the

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cyclical intersection market. The internal organization of the sections is of a different order from the organization of the relationships between sections. Within the sections reciprocity prevails whereas between the sections market exchange is the means of integration. Each of the sections is an "in-group" with members recognizing their identification as a unit and their mutual obligations. The interaction between sections, on the other hand, is based upon a recognition of essential differences and potential antagonisms.

This model utilizes a principle derived from the Polanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson analysis and applied by Francisco Benet to the Berber market, namely, the separation of the village economy from the market.

How well does this principle apply to each of the three cultures? Among the Highland Maya, *municipio* membership, which is proclaimed by costume, is the guidepost for exchange relationships in the market. While there is no explicit sanction against exchange within the *municipio,* such occurrences are rare. Furthermore, "foreigners" are unqualifiedly tolerated in the market situation, but not in the *municipio* on nonmarket days. In Berber economy, as Benet emphasizes, market exchange and village reciprocity are completely separated, both spatially and functionally. Exchange relationships are restricted to the market and forbidden within the village; the only merchants who deal in the village are peddlers of "foreign" or marginal identification who sell women's goods and are paid by barter in kind. Other nonvillagers encountered inside the village are potentially hostile objects, but at the market they are neutral. The Dahomean craft guilds and specialized villages are organized in a strictly nonmarket, reciprocal pattern which is based on work cooperation and mutual aid and is usually reinforced by kinship bonds. It is with specialists from other quarters and other villages that the Dahomeans exchange in the market, and the market is the primary place and time of such transactions.

A primary element of the economy in the three cultures is specialization. The Guatemalan Maya and the Berbers both occupy highland evnironments in fairly close proximity to lowlands, in which the variations in altitude present a situation highly conducive to local specialization. Although some writers have attempted to find a similar situation of environmental differentiation in West Africa, in a contrast of forest and savannah or of coast and inland, it appears rather that the Dahomean pattern of specialization is of a more "artificial" type, that is, it is not as closely related to the demands of environment (see discussion by Kirchhoff, Tax, and others, 1952, pp. 74-75). The Dahomean specialized units nevertheless function in the market system in precisely the same way as do the "naturally" specialized Guatemalan *municipios* and Berber villages.

Polanyi has made the important distinction between "price-making" and "set-price" markets. These cyclical markets, however, do not fall neatly into either category. It is clear that they are not perfectly competitive, are not based upon complete specialization or large-scale production for the market, and have not elaborated all aspects of the exchange relationship into marketable commodities. Nevertheless, as Sol Tax (1952) has shown for the Maya case, they represent instances of societies primitive in technology and in social organization, which have developed a high degree of commercialism and closely approach a system of "free," spontaneous price fluctuation.

The three market systems do, in fact, satisfy most of Polanyi's criteria of the price-making market. These markets are the primary means for exchange of essential goods between the sections. The persons engaged in market transactions have a profit motive. Exchange takes place essentially between individuals rather than between groups; in Dahomey, however, the products of a guild or trade society are sometimes marketed by individuals representing these groups. There is an element of antagonism between individ-

uals exchanging in the market. Bargaining is engaged in or other means for each partner to make the price as favorable to himself as possible, even in exchange of staple goods. In other words, prices are at least to some extent the result of market acts, not the pre-condition of them. Prices tend to fluctuate according to supply and demand. Finally, the medium of transaction in the market is almost exclusively "all-purpose" money, rather than barter in kind.

In general, these markets approach a situation of free prices on strategic goods, and they share many other characteristics of price-making markets.

In all three cultures, market exchange is the form of integration between sections. Within each section, however, this system does not operate. Rather, the relationships described by Polanyi as "redistribution" and "reciprocity" govern the economy.

Redistribution in Guatemala functions as part of the politico-religious hierarchy, the ultimate center of which is the first *principale*. He is the focus of the redistribution that takes place at public fiestas and the center of the system of labor conscription for public service.

The Berber redistributor is the *amin*, the moderator of the village representative assembly. Whenever order is broken, a fine is paid to the amin, and at times of threatened crisis in the community he redistributes this fund in the form of a butchered sheep or ox.

In Dahomey, the redistributive system of primary importance centers on the *dokpwega*, the head of the *dokpwe*, which is the organization of all the active men of the quarter or village. The *dokpwega* controls the labor force of the community, which he assigns to the aid of anyone in the village needing it. In addition, he plays a redistributive role at funerals, where he supervises large-scale transferences of economic goods.

Reciprocity is the second form of economic relationship within the sections. In the three cultures, this pattern of movement of economic goods and services occurs through kinship obligations, particularly through specified movements at marriage. In Guatemala, the *compadrazgo* or godparenthood system constitutes an extension of the economic reciprocity of the kinship system. Another form of reciprocity in the three cultures is in work cooperation between separate households. In addition, Dahomey has two rather special institutions based upon economic reciprocity. The first of these is the craft guild; the guilds produce and sometimes market their work cooperatively. The second is the trade society, which is composed of all vendors of the same product in a given market; the members render each other mutual aid and protection.

Thus, economic organization within each of the sections is qualitatively different, both in structure and in "spirit," from that operating between the sections.

II

This model of the cyclical market system has important implications for political organization. A crucial feature of the model is the essential separateness of the units participating in the market system. Relationships between the separate sections in the market are not accompanied by any formal social structures. Market cycles overlap with one another; they are not discrete, closed political units. Moreover, because of its dispersed character, the cyclical market system resists centralized control. There have been repeated attempts to set up a central authority over the Berber markets, but none has succeeded for long. In Dahomey, according to Stanley Diamond, the king was fully aware that control of the market system would be necessary to consolidate his power, and he attempted to create the illusion of such control; he succeeded in collecting taxes from

the markets but never in truly regulating them. Thus, the market seems to inhibit the growth of formal political institutions, especially centralized ones.

It is suggested that the political systems of the three cultures are characterized by a tendency toward segmentation. Among the Maya, the political units, the *municipios*, are separate and distinct from one another. Centralization on the native level does not exist, nor has the *ladino* state which has long subjugated the *municipios* ever integrated them. The Berber cantons, likewise, have remained separate; tribal organization has existed only in the face of pressure from the outside. What is more, the Berbers have consistently resisted incorporation into the realm of the centralized government of the plains. In Dahomey, a permanent kingship was established, which was superimposed upon the separate units. However, integration into a centralized political system was never perfected. Stanley Diamond has described the multifarious ways in which the kin units have resisted consolidation and in which the kingship has attempted to overcome the tendency toward decentralization.

Integration between the sections, which centralized powers never fully achieved, is accomplished, in part, through the market system. The market relates the sections to each other, but it does not lead to the development of formal structures among them.

In the absence of centralization or of any bonds of unity between the trading sections, maintenance of the market peace depends ultimately upon a balance of forces between the units. In effect, control of the market comes from all the participants and does not need to be imposed from outside. Such a balance of forces implies relative equality and equivalence of component units. Therefore, the sections would probably not be stratified with respect to each other, nor would they be radically different in size or in the military power they command.

The prevalence of commercial relationships based upon antagonism of exchange partners, even though these do not extend to in-group relations, suggests that there would be a tendency to develop impersonal, external legal sanctions. In the three cultures, explicit sanctions do exist outside of those of kinship, religion, and guilt or shame. In all three cultures, there is some more or less impersonal agency outside of the kin group to which an individual who feels he has been wronged may have recourse.

In general, the most significant similarity among the political systems of the three cultures is in the existence of small, closely integrated units, the sections, and the loose organization of these units with each other.

III

In considering the value systems of the three cultures, it is apparent that their specific content is vastly different. Nevertheless, a number of similar themes can be identified which seem to be related to the existence of the cyclical market.

First, in all three the individual is recognized to be an independent agent who has the capacity and right of free choice. He is not, of course, free of group allegiances and obligations, but as long as his behavior does not conflict with the interests of these groups he is expected to act apart from them and in his own interests. The significance of this value in a system in which individuals make their own choices of when and where to go to market and in which exchange involves atomistic individuals is obvious.

Second, there is a distinct separation of sentiments toward the in-group from attitudes toward those not of the in-group. Identification with and loyalty to the in-group are strong, but attitudes toward others are casual or even hostile, and relationships are non-

binding. This differentiation of attitudes is related to the different orders of economic organization within the in-group and between in-groups. Furthermore, the various in-groups are discrete with respect to each other; there are no marginal or transitional persons, nor do individuals belong to more than one in-group.

Third, there is in the three cultures a set of values which Tax (1941) has demonstrated for the Maya--namely, an acquaintance with the differentness of other peoples and their ways, a tolerance of such variations, and an ability to have extended contact with others without personal involvement. These characteristics are to be expected in cultures where individuals regularly participate in markets composed of a mosaic of people of different kinds and engage in series of brief, impersonal exchange relationships with these various people.

Finally, the values of hard work, commercial gain, and accumulation of wealth are prevalent in the three cultures. In all three, behavior in the market is directed toward the earning of a profit. Even within the in-groups, wealth is a means of gaining status. It is clear that such motives are valued only insofar as they do not conflict with primary group allegiances. Nevertheless, there is in all three cultures abundant leeway for the expression of "commercial" values.

These values have different content, different specific references, and different emphasis in Maya, Berber, and Dahomey culture. However, all may to some extent be regarded as concomitants of the type of market system found in these cultures.

IV

In summary, three historically unrelated cultures were identified as having in common a market system of a particular type--the cyclical market. Various aspects of the economic life, political organization, and value system of the three cultures were considered to bear a significant relationship to the cyclical market system. The model upon which comparison of the three cultures was based was one in which a number of small, independent sections, each constituting a specialized unit and a social in-group, articulate with each other through the market system.

It should be emphasized that the present effort was directed toward an exploration of cross-cultural similarities rather than clarification of the many differences. In each aspect considered--economy, polity, and values--consistencies in structure among the three cultures could be discerned despite the extremely dissimilar cultural content.

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SOME STRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR CHANGE
IN PUEBLO AND SPANISH NEW MEXICO

Bernard J. Siegel

I

THE INDIAN pueblo of Picuris and the mile-distant Spanish American village of Penasco resemble each other in a number of superficial aspects.[1] To judge simply from what can be observed on any randomly selected workday one would hardly credit them with such divergent cultural histories. Penasco exemplifies the Spanish American peasant type of intermediate society, whereas Picuris social structure conforms to the typical deme.[2]

But the superficial view exhibits, for example, adobe construction virtually identical in both materials and methods in the two villages, save that of a very few recently built dwellings and public buildings in the Spanish village. The habitation nucleus in the pueblo is more compact, but this is probably a function of its much smaller size, for many households in each abut on one side of the next, and independent units stand close to more linear arrangements.

The attire of both sexes is much the same (with the exception, of course, of the Picurenses' concern with ceremonial costuming); animal husbandry, crops grown, and agricultural methods are so similar in both places as to be superficially indistinguishable to the itinerant visitor. Even the idle fields are very nearly randomly distributed throughout the area.

Resemblances extend also to matters less obvious at first blush. In both communities, for example, a number of vigorous adult married men work more or less continuously at jobs some distance away, at the same time maintaining domiciles in their respective villages. There is this important difference: the Indians tend to move as a family from one residence to the other, whereas Spanish men tend to leave wives and families behind. At any given time, therefore, one will find a greater disproportionate adult sex ratio in Penasco as compared with Picuris. In both, however, there is a considerable mobility. Spanish may travel considerable distances to celebrate *en famille* two or three important ceremonial occasions on the Christian calendar; they may visit siblings or children more casually in Taos or as far away as Albuquerque. Indians do the same, but in addition they will attend festivals as guests in other pueblos whenever possible. Since the service of a bus line was discontinued a few years ago, Indians have felt severe frustration and deprivation in their efforts to visit abroad more freely.

Neither community is productively self-sufficient. The Spanish in an earlier generation raised far more of what they consumed and produced surplus for trade in nearby hamlets, villages, and towns. To the Picurenses such production of cash crops is much more recent. Even today it is carried on by only a few families and on a very small scale. Indians trade on credit predominantly in nearby stores operated by merchants in the Spanish vil-

lages. Less frequently than the Spanish they also travel to more distant centers--even on occasion to Santa Fe--to shop more economically.

Until recently Indian children attended federal board-in high schools in Santa Fe and Albuquerque after completing earlier training in a reservation school. For the past six years schools have been integrated, and the reservation school no longer operates. It is still possible to opt between the local and agency high schools, however, but of four current students of this age only one goes to Santa Fe. It is still too early to assess the consequences of integrated school life for Spanish and Indian alike.[3] The residue of formal educational experience for Picurense adults still involves a meaningful physical separation of adolescent children from family and the pueblo and must be considered together with other factors of individual mobility.

Finally, the annual rotating recruitment of political officials has enabled most adult males at one time or another to travel frequently to Albuquerque on Agency business. Some individuals of course exhibit greater talent than others in arguing pueblo causes and needs, are better skilled in the use of the English language, or act as chauffeurs (only three persons can drive an automobile), and so are involved more regularly than others in such trips.

To ascertain the emotional basis of interaction between Indian and Spanish requires considerable probing. Amiable relationships occur in a number of contexts: collaboration in the butchering of a pig; attendance at weddings, particularly between Spanish principals; purchasing; occasional visiting between friends; and greetings exchanged between compadres. Unless specific individuals are named to the contrary, however, Spanish and Indian alike almost invariably invoke deprecating and hostile stereotyped images of the other. The warmth of specific personal relationships has the quality of friendship (this applies also to buyer-seller relationships), and has had little if any effect upon the restrained, mutual self-consciousness which acts as a barrier to more meaningful cultural communication.

For the past quarter century there have been no mixed marriages, and during the preceding generation very few. But even when the selection of mates was much freer the newly married couple tended to make either an Indian or Spanish social identification. Differences in religious training of sons of mixed marriages primarily symbolized this identification, and made the cultural gulf very nearly as great as in the parental generation. Intercultural learning was therefore at a minimum. The sociocultural isolation even in such intimate forms of contact was reinforced by patrilocality and the similarity in the domestic roles of women. The physical loss of women was therefore culturally unimportant, and in so far as they were the only continuing alien models in the socialization of children they provided few if any new strains in role identification and the development of the self.[4]

II

We have observed above that Picuris and Penasco have suffered certain changes in the past two generations. The basis for these changes lies in increased wage-earning opportunities elsewhere in and out of the state of New Mexico, accompanied by a decline in attention to agriculture. Agricultural decline is a matter of attitude and not of necessity in both communities, but the attitudes are different in each case. The problem is somewhat beyond the scope of the present paper. It concerns in part a critical re-evaluation of the peasant's traditional love of the land; in part also it involves an examination of the relation between ideology and more direct coping techniques of culture.

More than 50 per cent of the male family heads are absent from Penasco anywhere from six to nine months of the year, returning two or three times for short periods at Christmas and Easter. The men work in mines in Nevada and Utah, and to a lesser extent in recent industrial developments connected with uranium mining in eastern New Mexico. A few have moved with their families but hold on to property and return periodically to visit or vacation with members of the remaining extended family. The only adult men who regularly live on a year-round basis in the community are a few merchants (two of these are non-Spanish), two garage owners, and schoolteachers.

Through resettlement Picuris lost about half the young men (now in their twenties) who went into military training after the Korean war. Three live in the Los Angeles area, one in Albuquerque, and one in Seattle. One of these is a highly respected young man of twenty nine, son of the last acknowledged great man of the pueblo. He works as an X-ray technician at a Veterans Administration hospital. Two brothers (one married with two children) are mechanics at an aircraft factory. Another is a sheet metal worker in Albuquerque. One man sixty two years of age, a former governor of the pueblo, has worked in civil service positions at various reservation schools in Colorado and Arizona for over thirty years. He has been regularly employed away from the community longer than any other individual. Yet he never has sold, rented, or ceded his home or property to anyone during this period. Only last summer (1958) he took a leave of absence to build himself a new house in the pueblo.

Yet another older man, a skilled carpenter, lives primarily as a farmer but gains employment on various small projects in the district during the summer months. At one time he resided with his family for two years in Albuquerque on the payroll of a building contractor. Occasionally he will return there alone for a few months on short-term jobs. His domicile is clearly the pueblo.

Each community has experienced different problems of adaptation as a consequence of these external attractions and depletion of manpower. Among Penascans de facto parental authority has defaulted to women, and maternal grandmothers, traditionally an important element in child rearing, bring up an increasing number of youngsters. The cultural definition of female roles is undergoing change as women have either ceased to be economically productive (weaving, gardening) or been enabled to engage in small enterprises through inheritance. Domestic instability has increased; the informal power structure is modified at least in emphasis with an increasingly important role played by school officials and perhaps a mounting competition between home and school for the allegiance of children.

These are only a few of the readily observable social reorientations. What is important to note is that people, with the exception of educators or shopkeepers, by and large express little concern over the ultimate fate of the village. It will continue, albeit in altered form. Natives there and abroad are greatly attached to the place for its physical beauty and climate, as well as out of nostalgia. They hold on to land, rent homes to schoolteachers, and return for vacations. They move with some regret but not with apprehension.

Picuris gives a very different impression. The similar decrease in agricultural output is closely linked with a reduction in ceremonial societies from six to one. Only a year ago the cacique gave up his religious instructional duties, and no one is likely to replace him. The key political office of governor--which faces the world outside the pueblo in important ways--now circulates among a very few responsible men. When an effort is made, as it was last year, to spread these responsibilities more widely several men may be put

in and out of office by the council in a single year. This is a matter of great concern.

Elders and parents continue to identify with as much of traditional activities as they can in their reduced numbers, but they fail to communicate associated values with conviction. They feel the loss of participation in sacred and civil affairs by boys and young men, but they do not attempt to counteract attractions to competing wants which can only be pursued in places far removed from the pueblo. There results, therefore, not only an erosion of behavioral norms, but also an alarming incidence of alcoholism and aggression. Among the older people of integrity much ambivalence is expressed between encouraging their children to prepare themselves for job opportunities outside the pueblo and a concern for reconstituting the pueblo along modified lines. It is somewhat paradoxical that just at this time, when children are beginning to remain much longer under actual physical control of parents and the pueblo, cultural values should be transmitted with so little commitment.

In comparing these communities, our interest centers on two related facets of adaptation and adjustment to stress: (1) the nature of social and individual accommodations within the group, and (2) the effectiveness of individuals who have left or attempted to uproot themselves from their natal villages. We can only summarize in general from evidence derived from case materials, especially as it bears upon the role of significant structural differences between the two groups.

<center>III</center>

Penasco exhibits among others the following structural features. First, there are decided social distinctions based upon wealth, occupation, and education. For the able and motivated, education provides the most important available means for the achievement of rank and respect outside of entrepreneurship. Teachers are preponderantly male, but only a small number of individuals actually elects teaching as a profession. Virtually all have come from farming families, where the economic obstacles in the way of requisite higher education are formidable. Teachers maintain a respect for farming, and, whenever possible, raise and slaughter a few animals and grow whatever garden produce they and their families can manage to cultivate.

Second, inheritance patterns coupled with possible occupational choices abroad favor a considerable number of matrilocal families. This is true to some degree at all levels: among teachers who marry, settle, and find positions in the wife's natal village; among some shopkeepers where the business belongs to the wife's father or is inherited by the wife and run by her and her husband jointly;[5] and among small landowners, in which the husband may settle on the property inherited by the wife even though he will find employment elsewhere.

Third, maternal grandparents--and especially the grandmother--continue to play an important role in the socialization of the young. It is, in fact, customary for a mother's mother to take one or more of her daughter's younger children to raise in her home. This lineal extension of the family in some cases helps to take up the slack occasioned by the absence of the father.

And fourth, Penascans early become familiar with the availability of parallel occupational roles of several kinds--in agriculture, industry, and business--comparable to those in their own community. In general throughout a large part of the western and southwestern part of the country there is a replication of role alignments from community to community. Enculturation within any part of this region facilitates adjustment to any

other part in terms of familiarity with behavioral norms and expectations. By the same token, of course, mobility tends to be selective within the area. Wherever a person settles anywhere from southern Colorado to Utah, Nevada, and even parts of California, he is likely to find acquaintances, kinsmen, neighbors, or people very much like himself. On the other hand he is not likely to move outside these limits.

For a community with such a long history of intensive collective life, it is surprising to encounter in Picuris, on the other hand, such jealous guarding of nuclear family independence. Parents are expected to help their grown children in small ways, but any felt exploitation on the part of the former can lead to serious conflict and even breaches in the relationship. Leaving children in the care of grandparents too frequently or use of facilities in the mother's home as if it were a matter of automatic right--in short, any continuation of early dependency behavior after marriage--can lead to criticism and more.

Parents control property while they are alive, and are reluctant to cede unused parcels of land to married children. A son thus will be dependent upon the largess of his mother or father, being put in the ambivalent position of simultaneous dependency and responsibility as a family head. He can apply to the Council for free untitled land, and occasionally does so if he feels secure enough to proceed on his own.

One of the consequences of the weakened commitment to traditional values in the process of cultural transmission is the insecurity of available manpower for desired and important social tasks. There are still ceremonial heads to organize the annual fall trek to the sacred place of cultural renewal in the mountains a few miles distant. It is also possible to mobilize participants for winter and summer solstice ceremonies. Families will return at considerable effort and sacrifice at these times to contribute their services and re-establish links with the community. But with the disbanding of certain kiva societies several other important symbolic and collaborative activities have also *ceased* to be carried on. The rabbit hunt is one of these; cooperative planting and harvesting groups are others.

Perhaps the single most significant social fact about Picuris is that it approaches, as mentioned earlier, the structure of a classic deme. It is not so inbred as Taos pueblo which in 1950 was 90 per cent endogamous, but it does approximate a bilateral descent group. Of twenty-one nuclear families in 1958 all but four marital unions were between Picuris citizens. Three of the exogamous marriages brought in San Juan women, and one a young man also from San Juan, a Tanoan pueblo on the road to Santa Fe. These two communities have enjoyed very cordial relations ever since the Pueblo Rebellion of 1680 in which both played prominent roles.

It is important to remember that in Picuris, as at Taos, even residents by marriage must undertake responsibilities of citizenship in the new community. For women this is relatively easy despite a language barrier and the necessity for husband and wife to communicate largely in Spanish or English. Men, on the other hand, labor under the dual handicap of entering with a lack of property and of needing to learn the details of alien ceremonials and sacred knowledge. Despite the formal similarity among eastern pueblos in matters of religious training and observances, the differences are important. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that when mixed marriages do occur residence is preferentially patrilocal. It is also interesting to observe that with all the mutual visiting at times of solstice ceremonials guest-friend relationships tend to be somewhat formal. Even Indian acquaintances from other pueblos are not completely trusted behind the wall of secrecy where each autonomous entity zealously guards its last defenses.

How, then, can we relate these structural and behavioral observations in the pueblo and

Spanish communities to forms of adjustment to external pressures of proliferating alternatives, imperatives, and attractions, with which inhabitants from each must increasingly cope?

IV

The deme quality of Picuris; the fact that Tiwa is the first language, is the one in which all adults are most fluent, and is spoken with only 150 other individuals; and the close association between religious ideology and traditional role learning all conspire against effective adjustment outside their little world. Picurenses have behind them many generations of experience in coping with intensive social interaction. Togetherness is no byword with them. The genesis of collaboration in many collective enterprises of group life lay in the productive relation of man to the land. The people are closely attuned to nature. The motivations which reinforce and extend the collective effort consist of supernatural interpretations of man's place in nature here, in this setting. This requires self control over impulses and special training to insure such control. Nucleated residence patterns necessitate some respect for the privacy of others, but that has always been hard to maintain without friction, strain, and even open conflict from time to time. Everyone expects conflict, but when there existed a greater sharing of conviction about common goals and values there was also agreement on the proper mechanisms of resolving conflicts. Authority commanded respect; for the wisdom that underlay authority ultimately served the self interest of everyone.

Self-reliance at the same time is at a premium. The social knowledge and coping techniques are not readily transferred elsewhere. Those who elect to leave do not have the inner resources to live so much of the time alone in a sea of others. And when they do find their leisure with others it is in the context of contrived interaction. However unsatisfied Anglos may be with the groping efforts of community life in city and suburbia, they at least carry with them in their moves for self-advancement, a kit of techniques which are as suitable in one place as another.

The efforts at settlement away from the pueblo are made at great cost to the individual, inasmuch as the rewards of effort are so intangible and one can so easily cease trying and return to the pueblo with no one to disapprove his failure.

Despite the considerable disorganization of collective life in Picuris today the most constructive innovations are being made with a gradually reconstituted leadership and a reshaping of values in the local group. This may achieve some measure of success to the extent that full advantage is taken of local resources.

As we have seen the Spanish Americans in Penasco have no such provincial commitment, reinforced by localized sentiment, ritual and religious symbols. They are accustomed to trading, working, and aspiring (by means of education and professional achievement) in a part Spanish, part Anglo world. Many of the new opportunities and alternatives occur within a belt of Spanish settlements which enables them, like the Anglos, to move among others like themselves or of themselves. Matters of security, language, and value emphasis inhibit most of them from leaving this world permanently or for other than special purposes. But their horizons have for long extended beyond local boundaries, and present tendencies are only an intensification of past potentialities.

By way of conclusion I should like to make some tentative generalizations from these observations. First, peasant types of intermediate societies, as exemplified by the Spanish American, provide their members with varied types of replicable experiences in partly familiar contexts. The urban facet of these experiences needs far more detailed explication. Population disturbances and curtailment of certain local activities will create some disorganization of local community life, but those who remain can draw upon past experiences with these changes and compensate or realign themselves in other than nativistic ways.

Second, by contrast tribe and demelike communities provide many fewer types of replicable experiences. The pueblos are notoriously impoverished in this respect. The result is that traditional mobility (apart from warfare) is confined to far more homologous and less varied social contexts. Customary relations based upon market, town, and conspicuous difference in style of living are not part of the normal repertoire of adjustive techniques. The psychic cost of coping with new experience is therefore apt to be very high and accompanied by a considerable frequency of self-destructive behavior. External pressures which result in selective population imbalance and curtailment of collaborative enterprises in natal communities would expectably create a high degree of social disorganization and a weakening of local values without a substitution of others. The study of the dynamics of these varied societies will involve different conceptualizations of the kinds of interaction between environmental changes, on the one hand, and group structure and cultural organization, on the other.

<div align="right">Stanford University</div>

NOTES

1. Over a period of two years I was engaged in the study of a problem in social change at Picuris pueblo. Part of this time I lived in the pueblo and part in the neighboring Spanish village. I was thus enabled to learn about the kinds and qualities of interaction between the two communities as well as their significance for the behavior of pueblo citizens. In addition I drew upon many contacts and observations in the Spanish village to construct important features of the social system, and began to reflect upon the respective careers of these two communities in terms of their structural attributes. This paper presents some of my observations and conclusions.

2. Using a term derived from the name of the local group in ancient Attica, Murdock defines a deme as an endogamous local community. See Murdock (1949, pp. 62-63).

3. I have attempted to secure information on the forms and quality of interaction in the classrooms and play yards, attitudes toward school personnel and interpretation of the aims of formal education on the part of Indian parents and children, and related material.

4. The reader is referred to Bruner's hypothesis on the significance of alien parents living continuously at the domestic hearth as a socializing agent under acculturative stress (1956, pp. 605-23).

5. In the latter case the husband may augment the income from a very small business by wage work elsewhere.

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TASK GROUPS AND MARRIAGE IN WESTERN SUMBAWA[1]

Peter R. Goethals

FOR ALMOST a century one major pattern of Indonesian social organization has aroused considerable special interest among ethnologists. Known best from the Makassarese area of southern Celebes,[2] this pattern affiliates each member of a given sibling set exclusively with one parent or the other depending upon the individual's order of birth. In some circles of Makassarese society this has traditionally meant that a couple's first, third, and other odd numbered offspring have been regularly affiliated with the mother while, on the other hand, the even numbered children have maintained affiliation with the father.

Notwithstanding the efforts to explain this pattern as one stage in the evolution of Indonesian society and despite a recent account of its persistence in southern Celebes[3] there has as yet been no comprehensive analysis of its role in any of the regional Indonesian societies where its occurrence has been noted. One such society is that of western Sumbawa, an area close to southern Celebes, long subject to Makassarese cultural influence and where a pattern of alternate affiliation was described as long ago as 1876. By synthesizing this early account with more recent data from western Sumbawa this paper outlines certain features of the pattern, indicates their historical importance and suggests what their effects have been in the marriage patterns of the modern village. Such a preliminary analysis will provide a specifically historical approach to the "intermediate society" of modern rural Sumbawa and, it is hoped, stimulate renewed interest in the scrutiny of such patterns in other sectors of Indonesia.

As the crow flies Sumbawa island lies less than a hundred miles due east of Bali and within two hundred miles of southern Celebes. Even as the island is triangulated geographically between Bali and Celebes so it has developed as a common frontier to these two heartlands of east Indonesia's most aggressive indigenous states. Following an early period of political ties with Bali[4] western Sumbawa fell under the yoke of militantly Islamic Makassarese political influence in about 1620. This initiated throughout the island about two centuries of political domination and cultural influence from south Celebes. Almost all of Sumbawa's states have, as a result, felt the strong and active impact of Makassarese patterns and, although the political influence from Celebes has generally declined since mid-nineteenth century, strong genealogical and cultural ties are felt to this day between Sumbawa's royal houses and the Makassarese court at Goa.

When western Sumbawa first emerged historically during the seventeenth century it was already divided among several states centered mainly in the small river basins of the north coast. These states were organized into a federation of which Sumbawa, the easternmost of the group, was the largest and the dominant political unit. At the same time these comparatively well settled coastal seats of political power were highly discontiguous

geographically and Sumbawa's hegemony over them has always been more symbolic and sporadic than politically effective. Even the colonial Dutch who maintained distant contractual relationships with Sumbawa as the area's paramount power clearly recognized the shifting nature of allegiances within the loose federation of "vassal states."[5] Accounts of the island often testify to the strong attitudes of independence--and even scorn--on the part of local leaders toward the federation's supreme ruler, Datu Semawa--otherwise known as the sultan of Sumbawa.[6] Even the indigenous titles of the nobility, which indicate the region or village of origin, suggest the strong currents of local pride and custom that have steadily sapped all efforts towards centralizing political hegemony over the area.

Basic to all political hegemony in western Sumbawa has inevitably been the control of agricultural land. Since the seventeenth century this has meant primarily the patches of irrigated rice terraces centered in the half dozen lowland basins of the north coast. These have provided the natural alluvium and water essential to irrigated rice lands and have also developed the strongest local social and political traditions. Notwithstanding their vulnerability to the chronic devastation of coastwise piracy they have consistently remained the focal areas of western Sumbawa's settlement and most intensive population growth.

The most violent single disruption to this settlement and sociopolitical development of Sumbawa took place in April of 1815 when Tambora, the gigantic volcano of the island's northern peninsula, erupted catastrophically and without warning. In magnitude the cataclysm was fully equal to the more celebrated spectacle of Krakatau almost seventy five years later. From the meager firsthand accounts of the event it has been estimated that over 60 per cent of the island's total population fell victim to Tambora's "rain of ash" and its aftermath.[7]

The entire population of two of Sumbawa's small states was exterminated on the spot, thousands died of starvation following the devastation of their livestock and arable land and additional thousands fled the stricken island to the neighboring areas of Lombok, Bali, Flores, and even Java and the Moluccas. Especially ravaged by the eruption were the lowlands and interior plains of the western peninsula including the agricultural heartland of the state of Sumbawa. The prevailing winds of April, 1815, spread such enormous deposits of volcanic debris across this area that even thirty years later a Swiss naturalist traversing the island was able to describe great sections of it as a deserted "wasteland" where his horse sank to its knees in tuff and breccia along the road.[8] In other respects as well the effects of the disaster were all too evident: the deserted villages by the roadside, the poverty ridden hamlets along the coast, and the dead and dying livestock of the countryside.

About sixty years after the eruption of Tambora an officer of the Netherlands Indies administration made a brief visit to the court of Datu Semawa and soon afterwards, in 1876, published the first account of alternate affiliation for the area.[9] The details applied specifically to the settlement of the royal capital and its immediately surrounding countryside. Then, as today, the capital of the federation was known as Sumbawa Besar.

At this time Sumbawa's society included two main strata, the nobility and the commoners. Throughout both strata descent was reckoned bilaterally and within the nobility several formal rank levels were distinguished.[10] The highest of these was restricted in membership to Datu Semawa and his immediate family. These members of royalty all bore the title of *datu*, lived either at the royal court or mainly in the capital villages of the federated states, and formed several closely interrelated branches to Sumbawa's top ruling class. Many individuals of *datu* rank, including Datu Semawa himself, were of im-

mediate Makassarese origin and both the adat (custom) and trappings of the royal palace showed the strong impress of court patterns at Goa.[11] Beneath the *datu* level ranked a larger group of titled nobility comprised partly of the descendants of *datu* men and partly of a more indigenous Sumbawan aristocracy which traced little or no ancestry to Makassar. Each member of this titled group was further classed by subrank and bore a corresponding title which, in many instances, reflected the bearer's distance of blood connection with the royal family line.[12] People of common origin made up the bulk of the population below the nobility and supplied subsistence to Datu Semawa's court and retinue. Unlike the upper strata of society the commoners were not overtly ranked according to specific titles or criteria of descent.

Marriage patterns linking the segments of Sumbawan society at this period are best known from among the nobility. Within the *datu* rank integrity of descent was maintained by a pattern of rank endogamy so that a *datu* man always took a primary wife from his own rank. Yet in the wealthy polygynous *datu* households an additional pattern of hypergamy also allowed the men secondary wives and consorts from among the lesser nobility and commoners. A similar pattern of rank endogamy and hypergamy prevailed among the lesser nobles. However, children born of recognized unions between any man of nobility and women of lesser rank (whether noble or commoner) generally assumed the rank level just below that of the father and the male or female titles appropriate to it. Thus the child of a *datu* man by a woman of common birth would become a noble, the child of a nobleman by a commoner would remain a commoner. Under the system if a man, Z, had a paternal grandfather of *datu* rank who had married a commoner and their son, Z's father, had then also married a commoner, Z, only two generations removed from royalty, would no longer be recognized of noble rank.

The division between Sumbawa's rank-conscious nobility and the lower strata of society hinged mainly upon the hereditary ascription of duties in behalf of Datu Semawa. In general the commoner was subject to specific hereditary obligations while the member of nobility was not. Thus, at birth the commoner automatically became a member of a single particular task group, or group of workers collectively obligated to perform definite services on the lands or at the palace of Datu Semawa. Most often the individual's task group membership was identical with that of both his (or her) parents. However, in situations where the parents represented different task groups the child would inherit membership in but one of the groups, this depending upon his (or her) order of birth. The tasks inherited among the commoners varied considerably in their character and difficulty and by 1876 had clearly become the occupational criteria by which an individual's social prestige was to some extent gauged.

The exact number of the recognized task groups among Sumbawa's commoners is actually far from certain. However, in 1876 it is clear that there was a considerable number of them and that they ranged extensively in size from comparatively restricted groups to large and apparently semiskilled sectors of the population. One group known as the *tau sanak* was responsible for the performance of special ceremonial duties at the royal court. These included carrying water from sacred springs to the palace, acting as pallbearers at important funerals, and periodically performing the dances and mock combats appropriate for court entertainment. Usually these *tau sanak* held and worked parcels of agricultural land marginal to Datu Semawa's central royal lands and from their harvests were expected to pay an annual percentage as a form of tax to the royal coffers.[13]

A group obligated to somewhat heavier or more prolonged tasks was that known as the *tau merisi,* or bondsmen.[14] By 1876 this group actually comprised a number of lesser

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groups each of which maintained a recognized task obligation generally involving physical labor upon Datu Semawa's royal fields. Many, if not most, of the *tau merisi* lived close to the capital and one major constituent group, the *tau djuran* or "roundsmen," provided the entire labor supply for the rice lands supporting the royal court.[15] All farming operations on these fields including upkeep and repair of the irrigation system became their responsibility. The group included both men and women, none of whom apparently received recompense in kind for their services although what other resources they had for subsistence is not clear. Their labor obligations were fixed periodically according to their residence in particular villages each of which took its turn in supplying *tau djuran* on particular sectors of the royal fields. Since these obligations were transmitted from parent to child every sector of Datu Semawa's rice land was insured of a constant supply of obligated labor for its maintenance. In the metaphor of the local adat each field with its attached labor supply resembled a "tray with its cups."[16]

Another group of bondsmen was distinguished by having its labor obligations entirely within the precincts of the royal compound. Designated by the term *tanuma,* the task group included a variety of workers devoted to special, although often relatively unskilled, functions. Among them were ladies in waiting, sword bearers, armour attendants, horse attendants, umbrella bearers, palace guards, and even the wet nurses of the royal family.[17] The apparently diverse regional origins, duties, and terms of service of these particular bondsmen cannot be accurately reconstructed, but it is clear that many lived in villages quite distant from the royal court and were obligated to only occasional service. Others, by contrast, had begun to take up permanent residence at the royal palace and exchange their services for steady subsistence. Yet the majority of the *tanuma* apparently gained their primary subsistence independently of any work at the royal palace.[18]

As indicated the commoner's task group membership was linked closely with the system of alternate affiliation. At the time of marriage the individual was usually faced with the possibility of taking a spouse either from his (or her) own task group or from a different one. (Comparatively few task women took spouses from the noble class.) When marriage was within a single task group both parents already shared the same obligations and there was no question about the tasks inherited by their offspring. All became members of their parents' common group, and their inherited obligations remained binding for life regardless of any shift in residence. However, if the marriage took place between members of different task groups it was usual for the father subsequently to pass his task affiliations to the odd numbered offspring while those of the mother were passed to the even numbered ones.[19] Hence if a *tau djuran* married a *tanuma* the children would automatically be divided according to this scheme and the incumbent task obligations would be fully as binding as if inherited from a "homogenous" pair of parents. The account of 1876 unfortunately gives no clear indication of the probably crucial role of bride payments in intertask group marriages or whether it was possible in such situations to align all the children exclusively with merely one of the parents. It is evident only that these marriages were possible but probably somewhat more difficult and less frequent.

The chief result of the system was to perpetuate the responsibility for particular skills and tasks within individual family lines among the commoner population. By 1876 these various lines were represented by a considerable range in membership, were scattered in residence and included some heterogeneity of immediate ethnic background among their members.[20] Among groups of such diverse gross characteristics the system of task ascription as such could not have had uniform results--such as fostering endogamy within each group. Although in most of the groups concerned it probably encouraged this tend-

ency the parallel effect was to insure that in cases of intertask group marriages the resulting offspring would not be recruited entirely to one of the parental groups at the expense of the other.

The importance of the system becomes clearest when viewed against the political and economic conditions of the period. As a basis of political authority the control of arable land meant little without a parallel control over a productive resident population. Yet the 1815 holocaust had blighted most of the arable lowlands and caused such a drastic reduction and dispersal of the population that all the local leaders, including Datu Semawa, were reduced to essentially similar economic straits. Nevertheless in his attempts to reclaim a real domain from the devastation and ultimately utilize the proceeds to rebuild a loyal hierarchy of subordinate nobility Datu Semawa was inevitably led into either direct or covert conflict of interests with jealous local leaders. The economic competition between the royal and noble factions of Sumbawa's leaders emerges, in fact, as a dominant theme of the area's nineteenth-century history.

One partial solution to this power impasse lay in promoting local resettlement of new population from neighboring islands. Such immigration if restricted to the lands of a single leader would inevitably also bulk large in the consolidation of his political leadership. By the middle decades of the last century it is evident that Datu Semawa had not only undertaken to import settlers for his lands from south Celebes but had also achieved some success in enlarging both his effective working force and the lands under direct royal control.[21]

More than any other event since 1815 this transplanting of new settlers to Sumbawa has been instrumental in rebuilding the landscape and society of the realm. Over several decades the population influx gradually developed a new wedge of productive communities on the agricultural lowlands generally contiguous to Datu Semawa's capital. Inevitably this has been crucial to the economic rehabilitation of the region as a whole since the underpopulated lands of even the most independent of Datu Semawa's political competitors sooner or later were affected. It may also have been this resettlement which gave rise to the still current local "explanation" for the patterns of task ascription and alternate affiliation. This attributes them to Datu Semawa as the means by which he was able to maintain a steady laboring population upon the royal lands. Although no longer based upon recalled historical detail it suggests traditionally centrifugal forces tending to pull this population beyond reach of his effective control.[22]

The most immediate of such centrifugal forces stemmed, in fact, from the conditions of the immigrant population itself. Most of Datu Semawa's settlers arrived on his lands either as heavily indentured laborers or virtual slaves. Although little is known of their specific terms of servitude the settlers were organized into task groups and quickly found that hard working conditions and lowly status dominated their new existence. To some extent these inevitably became the causes of discontent and attempts to escape the royal tracts with their enforced servitude. The scope of these attempts is suggested by the very stringency of traditional adat maxims and regulations counteracting them. These strongly advocate the virtues of permanent residence while censuring vagrancy, unauthorized journeys, and irresponsible migrations on the part of commoners. Furthermore they indicate that historically there has been no more flagrant a violation of local adat than a commoner's fleeing his home community and appealing in distress directly to leaders of other regions.[23]

A second centrifugal force arose from the natural growth in numbers of the settlers and their need to expand to new lands. This expansion in different areas was inevitably chan-

neled and impeded by a variety of special factors. Most of these derived from the essentially political process of bringing the necessary new tracts under satisfactory royal control since many of the lands contiguous to the royal domain were nominally held by local nobles under a variety of traditional claims. Another special factor lay in the task specialties themselves: if real specialization had been achieved the mere haphazard addition of new tracts could not have consistently provided the proportionate new laboring opportunities for each steadily expanding group. This meant that relative extremes of worker excess or shortage for particular tasks were bound to occur unless other adjustments in labor power were constantly made to their demands. In the case of a task group which through steady recruitment over several generations had become excessively large one such adjustment could be achieved by reducing its obligations to a seasonal or periodic basis and shifting its members to residence and basic subsistence outside the royal lands.[24] These "outside lands" were in some cases unclaimed (although held nominally by Datu Semawa) while yet other settlers from the royal lands were also enabled by residential shift to join or establish outlying communities under the immediate jurisdiction of local nobility. While actively maintaining their hereditary obligations to Datu Semawa they were simultaneously able to shift their talents largely to the disposal of often impoverished local leaders and in return gain favorable--and in some cases essential--rights either to crops or land or even prestige within a local noble's retinue.

In spite of these long term tendencies the system of task ascription in itself did not enable Datu Semawa literally to maintain a diversified labor force resident upon his royal lands. To the extent that it was reinforced by other political sanctions the system became an important restraining check on immigrants attached to specific royal tracts by promoting their stability of residence and occupation. Yet perhaps by 1860 the growth of the new settler population began to produce a working force exceeding the needs either of the royal palace or agricultural lands and beginning to spill significantly into the areas beyond. Whether as settlers detached to the lands of established nobility or as independent pioneers on nominally royal frontier tracts the immigrants and their families continued to provide their ascribed special services for the royal lands. More significantly for the realm as a whole the task group system perpetuated a network of obligations which remained as clear tokens of political allegiance to Datu Semawa. During the greater part of the nineteenth century the system evidently functioned to provide and maintain the economic and political ties essential to the redeveloping Sumbawan state. Even when the Dutch administration finally arrived in 1906 the system remained an important element in the political structure of the area.[25]

The associated traditional pattern of alternate affiliation is not so clearly explained either in its detail or development. It is evident only that the division of children occurred after "mixed marriages" between members of ostensibly different task groups. Yet virtually nothing is known from the published accounts of the frequency of these marriages, the groups of commoners usually involved or the real alternatives in such cases to this pattern of child allotment. On the whole the existence of the pattern suggests that marriage endogamous to the task group was the prevalent ideal norm guiding a commoner's selection of a spouse. However, following the nineteenth-century growth in total population and the gradual fission of the task groups into localized, scattered branches outside the royal tracts such an ideal marriage probably became more difficult to arrange. Furthermore the increasing contact of the settlers with communities of indigenous Sumbawans and other ethnic groups prompted even more "distant" marriages across ethnic boundaries. Such developing assimilation meant that by the latter part of the nineteenth

century the "mixed marriages" which necessitated division of offspring actually included many unions between individuals whose socially most significant differences were no longer merely those of ascribed task group membership. In varying degrees the factors of divergent residence, economic status, ethnic antecedents, or the prestige of attachment to particular noble retinues had come to modify or supplant task group affiliation as the main criteria of spouse selection.[26] Hence the pattern of child division by 1876 in many cases reflected differences between socially more diversified groups among which it was important (following at least some intergroup marriages) to guarantee a mutually even recruitment of new members. Conversely marriages between socially and economically similar people of different task groups did not necessarily invoke the alternate affiliation pattern among the offspring. Therefore, although there is no simple historical explanation for the pattern, by the late nineteenth century it clearly reflected more than any royally supervised administration of task group membership.

When seen in the context of Sumbawa's total society the custom of child division suggests more than an endogamic marriage pattern. It also indicates a perhaps exaggerated general emphasis on the maintenance of group identity and zealous awareness of the comparative social status of one's immediate family or kin group with respect to others. Any real perspective upon the pattern must, in fact, link it with the strong tendency throughout Sumbawa's traditional society toward vertical social mobility. This is well documented only from the upper strata: the noble patterns of hypergamy, proliferation into finely differentiated levels of ascribed rank, and well known adat aphorisms about the relative status of family lines are several of the clearest indications of this. As within any stratified society of such tendency the calculations and negotiations leading to new affinal relationships necessarily become of crucial concern. The real importance of "marriage politics," as they have been aptly labeled from the Makassarese area,[27] has become strikingly evident from both the noble and commoner segments of Sumbawan society.

Of the historical events contributing to the role of marriage politics two have been indicated: the post-1815 immigrations and the subsequent assimilation of the settlers. To a considerable extent the continued pattern of mobility has reflected the ethnic diversity and the evident pioneer variety of working conditions and opportunities which have been instrumental in redeveloping Sumbawa's economic landscape. Also shaping the mobility pattern have been historically more deeply rooted antagonisms of local custom which have always figured importantly in the competition for political hegemony among Sumbawa's petty nobility. Although extended scrutiny of these various factors is well beyond the scope of this paper their historical reality provides an essential dimension to the profile of modern Sumbawan society.

During the present century the rural villages of western Sumbawa have variously felt the impact of population growth, some four decades of Dutch administration, a wartime Japanese occupation, and a revolution for national independence. These events have paralleled as well as contributed to the decline of much of the traditional state structure. Correspondingly, even in those villages most directly under the traditional control of Datu Semawa the knowledge of the old task group and adat terminology is sharply on the decline. Some senior villagers still recall whether or not their parents married within a single task group and, if not, how their own and their siblings' affiliations were worked out between two groups.[28] Others may admit to occasional instances of service as *tanuma* or speak of having accompanied their parents to the palace on tasks. Yet among the younger generation villagers most details of the old system are virtually unrecognized.

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Whatever the decline of the task groups the present Sumbawan villager still maintains a strong concern with the activities surrounding marriage. In terms of ceremonial display and financial outlay no other rite of the individual life cycle is generally of the same magnitude. For most villagers the ceremonials at birth, circumcision, and even death are usually almost meager by contrast. The negotiations leading to betrothal and marriage are carried out for most young people by their fathers, close male relatives, or village leaders and, although this pattern may today be on the decline in some villages, it remains especially important for the young man and woman who must maintain the financial support and goodwill of close kin. Agreement to a marriage usually follows a succession of discussions between the appointed negotiators for each party. These discussions, especially during their early stages, are usually surreptitiously carried out and carefully shielded from community gossip. Although more than half the marriages of a village may be endogamous to it and despite a high degree of marriage within the individual's circle of first and second cousins (on both sides) any strong personal ties that might automatically seem to stem from these bonds do little to alleviate the secrecy and interpersonal tension of betrothal negotiation and marriage. Even between blood brothers in arranging a match among their own children this tension is often apparent.

The major focal point of this anxiety is the cost of the ceremonial wedding feast. As lavish a feast as possible is deemed generally desirable for every young couple but it is also important that each of the marriage partners (with help from close supporting kin) contribute exactly one half its total cost. This large ceremonial feast follows by several days the legal Islamic wedding (nika) and requires much the largest single expense of marriage. Neither the small fees for the legal marriage nor the fixed bride price are subject to negotiation; the groom pays both. Instead it is the expense of the feast which can easily become the most debated item in the veiled negotiations preceding the betrothal announcement. Inevitably these negotiations often involve tacit demands or promises of property inheritance, land use and even religious offices as part of their covert media of exchange. Yet even after substantial separate agreement has been guardedly achieved on these larger terms debate on the expense of the ceremonial feast can seriously delay or even disrupt the entire chain of marriage preparations. The reason is twofold: neither of the negotiators, regardless of prior agreements, will willingly accept anything less than an exactly equal share of the feast costs and, secondly, very often one negotiator will attempt to raise the total cost of the feast above the other's ability to pay half so that he may then assume the payment of the major share himself. Most (although not all) this expense is figured in terms of goods (e.g., rice, coconuts, sugar) and detailed inventories of each negotiator's agreed upon share quickly become a major item of village gossip. If, then, one negotiator is known or thought to be making a lesser contribution to the feast both he and his clients (the spouse-to-be and kin) suffer humiliation. Rather than be exposed to this it may be preferable to break off the discussions altogether, if possible. In effect this means that, despite any tacit larger agreements between close kin of the spouses there should ideally be no overt discrepancy between them in respective support of the ceremonial feast and hence no implication of one group publicly patronizing the other.

If, on the other hand, the negotiations toward marriage are successful and lead to formal betrothal they are announced in a unique and rather dramatic fashion. This occurs with the "decision by words,"[29] a formal meeting between the negotiators before the assembled village leaders and elders. At this time the community is, in effect, informed that the final agreement on a match has been achieved and the couple formally betrothed.

Although the announcement is seldom really news to the villagers the occasion gives clear legal shape to the decision and agreed upon costs. Division of the expenses is recorded in writing and the dates of the legal wedding and the ceremonial feast then established. Yet all these bits of business come only after a period of stylized haggling between the negotiators over the marriage qualifications of their clients. The dialogue between them is metaphorical, apt to be witty and can extend as long as their ready wit endures. More significantly, however, it is markedly concerned with the working qualities of the two future spouses, the respective abilities of each as a competent man and woman and whether they are, in short, worth the price being paid by either party for the wedding. In particular the haggling may concern the woman whose physical beauty, ability to cook and plant rice, competence in weaving, and personal temperament may, *inter alia,* all be brought into question by the groom's negotiator. His opponent in behalf of the wife-to-be can retaliate with equally searching, metaphorically couched questions about the competence of the man as a farmer, hunter, general provider, and even religious singer. In some cases the questions will be expanded to query how fit the respective spouses are to conduct themselves competently before the nobility or even Datu Semawa himself.

Returning to the traditional patterns of Sumbawa's commoner society raises, finally, the question as to how they have discernibly affected the modern marriage negotiations at the village level. The lapse of the traditional social structure, as indicated, has been all but complete; in only one respect can formal continuity be suspected. This is in the exchange of questions during the "decision by words" which may be construed from their content as a survival of former task group marriage adat. However both in their bearing upon the conclusion of the actual match as well as in popular explanation these questions are not seriously regarded at present. Furthermore, neither the present vocabulary nor the older accounts of Sumbawan adat give clear support to their former functional importance.

Despite this dearth of formal perspective on modern marriage negotiations the alternate affiliation pattern may provide an historical clue to their development. Although the commoner groups subject to the 1875 patterns of intermarriage and child affiliation are not well defined it is assumed that they approximated social classes in size and complexity, shared the strong upper strata pattern of vertical mobility and were consequently ranked in overall prestige. Inevitably, however, marriage between members of these different groups to a considerable extent signified the social equality of the respective spouses, their close kin and potentially their status groups. Though cases of such intermarriage might generally be deemed a complex matter of convenience it would be recognized, nevertheless, that one spouse or the other was actually marrying beneath his (or her) level. To the extent that the spouse of higher status would tend to lose prestige through such identification the other would tend to gain in similar fashion. A traditional Sumbawan folk verse suggests the strength of this common identification of spouses through marriage:

> I seek adornment with a flower
> which if but full in foliage
> despite all terms will shelter me. [30]

Here the speaker looks for marriage ("adornment") with a person of higher status ("a flower") whose attached position ("full in foliage") will provide security regardless of any terms which the speaker must fulfill to make the marriage.

Although such traditional evidence from Sumbawa points strongly to the heightened prestige and security achieved even among commoners by taking a spouse from a higher status group it was of equal importance that the spouse "marrying down" did not compromise his or her own position through the tendency toward common identification. One technique of counteracting this identification lay in the systematic division of subsequent offspring between the parents. No other formal means of status ascription could, in fact, better establish and maintain the basic dichotomy of parental origins and thereby neutralize the tendency toward common social identification of the spouses.

Unlike the former practice of alternate affiliation, however, the modern villager's negotiations over marriage are not linked to any formally recognized social groups in the rural population. Differences of social class among Sumbawa's modern peasantry appear incipient at best and cannot be easily linked to the prevalent betrothal negotiation pattern. Nevertheless the importance of marriage ceremonial, its related anxieties of performance and its attempted symbolic expression of kin group equality all indicate the villager's fine awareness of differences in social level among the kin groups of his village and cousin circle. In his own community a villager's total social position is always a delicate composite of variables including his family size, the number of its active male members, its cohesion of personalities, its resources in land and livestock and the statuses its members may fill in the local civil or religious hierarchies. In these terms the villager judges his own relative social prestige and, in turn is judged whenever a betrothal is proposed for one of his close kin. Although he realizes that any marriage will reflect a gross social equality of the kin groups involved he also has the perspective to admit that the economic agreements of marriage become important adjustments for the natural inequities of membership and fortune among kin groups over the generations. Despite this insight he will probably continue, however, to take part in the strongly patterned competitive debate over allotment of wedding costs when he or a family member becomes involved in marriage preparations.

When seen as a technique of counteracting the close identification of differently ranked spouses the modern pattern does, in fact, take on a certain historical familiarity. If the implicit equality of a match is to be clearly sustained by both parties the negotiations are apt to be quickly concluded and, above all, lead to equal division of the wedding costs. However, such a smooth course of negotiation, although not rare, certainly does not appear as the rule. Much more frequent even for a match within a single village are the lengthily protracted negotiations which involve many visits between the negotiators and which are ultimately blocked for a period by one negotiator insisting that the total wedding cost be set too high. With careful assessment of the several risks involved the more demanding party can extend the impasse for many days, or perhaps even weeks, while allowing information on the deadlocked terms to leak to the community at large. Gossip rapidly develops about the rumored demands on each side and the different affluence and adat sophistication of the two negotiating parties becomes evident. Yet this tactic, inevitably can continue for only a limited time: the lesser party will not face the derogatory gossip and perhaps scorn of his neighbors for long unless he has substantial assurance of his own, or his child's long term material advantage from the impending match. The result can be variously that the negotiations are broken off, ruptured by an abduction marriage, [31] or--more usually, after the interest of the community has somewhat subsided--a quiet agreement is achieved. This last occurs in at least two ways: the first when a sudden gift of resources is made toward the wedding (in such form as a goat, rice, or suger) by a third party. This outsider in the negotiations is liable to be a village leader

of some wealth but his gift, in effect, makes up the deficit in the lesser party's share and clinches the question of the wedding outlay. The second more frequent type of agreement comes about through a concealed compromise on the wedding costs and a subsequent shuffling of the contributed items between the parties to disguise the reduced outlay finally agreed upon. Nevertheless by this time the disparagement of the less affluent party has been made clear while, by contrast, the other party through its unstinting efforts to insure a proper wedding ceremonial has shown only a befitting finesse and awareness of correct adat.

Such a pattern of what may be termed "deliberate disparagement," although exacerbated by a variety of particular situations, nevertheless has an effect strongly parallel to that of the alternate affiliation. Accordingly in the modern village one party may seek publicly to patronize the other in compensation for the pride lost in making real concessions (in promises of property inheritance, for example) early in the negotiations to favor the match. In another instance an unforseen village romance may force sudden betrothal negotiations between two mutually unrelated or uncongenial kin groups of different (real or imagined) status thereby provoking one negotiator to attempt his public disparagement as a matter of especial hostility. Yet common to these and other situations of betrothal negotiation is a unilateral effort to emphasize the status gulf and independence between two kin groups in the face of an almost certain impending marriage bond between them. Considered as a technique of emphasizing and perpetuating status level differences between spouses the former alternate affiliation had a very similar effect. Yet this older pattern was essentially one of social arrangement following a marriage while the villager's current efforts to stress status levels merely take the form of taut negotiation, the disparagement of one party, and then--finally--compromise. Furthermore, because the older pattern involved social groups of some formal definition it not only countered the tendency to merge the social identities of spouses but also symbolized an unequivocal social continuity of the separate intermarrying family lines and status groups. Today's villager and his potential spouse, by contrast, belong only to separate kin groups whose comparative social status cannot be a well defined matter of comparative rank but remains a more fluid question of individual judgment or community consensus. Consequently a large number of impending matches, although shaped by important economic considerations, also provoke the party of ostensibly higher status to re-emphasize his position by impugning the impending identification by marriage. Thus a common emphasis on equal sharing in the pattern of alternate affiliation provided a positive expression of group identity despite the link of marriage; today the same emphasis, embodied in an ideal of equal wedding support, provides similar expression because of its threatened negation prior to the marriage link.

With virtually nothing known of the arrangements leading to the former "mixed marriages" formal historical antecedents to the present village betrothal negotiations must remain obscure. Nevertheless a similarity between the previous affiliation pattern and today's betrothal techniques is to be seen in the degree of their functional equivalence within Sumbawan commoner society. At different time periods both patterns by channeling the alignments of social level between kin and status groups have clearly articulated the important Sumbawan theme of prestige seeking. In recognizing the importance of this theme in the total society the unique pattern of alternate affiliation emerges, in fact, as a distinct historical clue to the current betrothal practices in the rural village.

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NOTES

1. This paper is a revision and expansion of the one read at the Spring Meeting.

   The research in western Sumbawa upon which this paper is partly based was carried out between 1954 and 1956 and was generously financed by the Ford Foundation. However the Foundation is not to be construed as approving by virtue of the grant any of the statements made in this paper. I wish in addition to make grateful acknowledgment of the support also afforded this research by the Lembaga Bahasa dan Kebudjean of the University of Indonesia in Djakarta.

2. See the work of Friedericy, 1933, and also the three well known articles of Wilken, 1912.

3. References quoted in the summary article of Korn 1952.

4. Graaf, 1941, pp. 355-56.

5. Graaf, 1941, p. 367. Original references are given here to the daily records of the Dutch East India Company in which in several instances the factionalism and political intrigue of these unstable petty states is indicated.

6. See especially Zollinger's remarks from his conversations with the various local "under-kings" of western Sumbawa in 1849.

7. Especially Lekkerkerker, 1933, which summarizes the few historical sources, and contains the only real estimate available of loss of lives.

8. Zollinger, 1850, pp. 159-61.

9. Ligtvoet, 1876. The author was an official of the Netherlands Indies Government who had been long stationed at Makassar.

10. Bilateral kinship is seen from the actual kinship terminology used at all levels of Sumbawan society and from the use of the old term *ruwe* (translated in the Dutch sources as "family") both for the nobility and the commoners (Ligtvoet, 1876, pp. 556-57) and their task groups. The origin of this term is far from clear and today it has fallen into abeyance in Sumbawa. At different times, however, it seems to have designated two types of nonunilineal descent groups (having respectively a connecting ancestor or a connecting relative). Ligtvoet, in fact, speaks of the various *ruwe*(s) often having subdivisions which apparently were unrecognized terminologically except by the term *ruwe*, also. (Ligtvoet, 1876, pp. 567-68.) For data on the rank levels of the nobility some details are found in Ligtvoet, 1876, Seegler, 1937, and van der Welk, 1941. By the end of the nineteenth century the proliferation of the noble strata into many levels had developed into an exceedingly complicated system with much regional variation in form and use of titles.

11. Ligtvoet, 1876, pp. 556-58. Kuperus (1937) suggests that on the basis of the resemblance of Sumbawan adat law with that of Makassar the area should be regrouped into the Celebes circle and not be included in the Bali-Lombok circle. He limits his suggestion to recent adat law from western Sumbawa and largely for the upper levels of Sumbawan society.

12. Ligtvoet, 1876, pp. 558-59.

13. Wolk, 1941, pp. 39, 62. This group stood between the nobility and the commoners in the group ranking system of the total society and in many instances were the children of nobles who had "married down" and who retained fairly prestige-full jobs and some privileges. Probably their designation (roughly: "people of the family") indicates their distant descent from nobility. It is not really clear whether they were "low grade nobility" or "commoners of blood" in the social continuum; it is only clear that they had *some* duties and were subject to the alternate affiliation of their children.

14. This equivalent of the term *tau merisi* follows van der Wolk (1941, p. 39) since the conditions of these bondsmen were varied: some were adat violaters sentenced to labor, others were former war prisoners and yet others had been vagabonds. Many, too, were immigrants probably brought to the area by Datu Semawa (see later section of paper) and possibly giving their name to the group (i.e., *tau merisi* or roughly "filler people").

15. Ligtvoet, 1876, p. 565. For data on villages of residence see *ibid.*, p. 562 and Seegler, 1937, p. 516. Today the term *djuran* is forgotten by many villagers and seems originally to have indicated a group (when coupled as in *tau djuran*) which took its turn at a routine task, as during the services at the mosque each night during the month of fasting. The *tau djuran* were apparently distinguished sharply from the *tanuma* by having their duties on the royal lands but outside the palace precincts (van der Wolk, 1941, p. 39).

16. Van der Wolk, 1941, p. 36. Phrase: dulang ké pangisi.

17. A number of Makassarese-Buginese terms designated some specialties among the *tanuma*, including the *djoa* and *bone* who, by the latter nineteenth century referred respectively to court attendants (male) and ladies in waiting. Groups of these were then known for their areas of provenience and had developed special terms to indicate their unique abilities in special tasks. Probably several were also specialized entirely along sex lines (in addition to the wet nurses) but to what extent these divergences influenced the marriage patterns is far from clear.

18. Ligtvoet, 1876, p. 566. Here its said that the *tanuma* were mostly maids for the royal family; this does not seem to have continued for by the early twentieth century the term *tanuma* in several villages near Sumbawa Besar had come to include tasks of greater variety.

19. There has, in fact, been considerable controversy about such a system ever operating either in Makassar or in Sumbawa. Recently Chabot writes that he found no evidence for its operation in south Celebes (Chabot, 1950, p. 81) whereas van der Wolk, who spent some six years in Sumbawa as the Netherlands Indies Gezaghebber, writes (van der Wolk, 1941, p. 32) that there never was such a system locally. The implications of the differences in child allotment (i.e., in Sumbawa the first going to the father and not, as in Celebes, to the mother) will be explored in a forthcoming paper.

20. For data on the scattered residences of the task groups members see Kuperus, 1937, Ligtvoet, 1876, and Seegler, 1937. Kuperus cites older information from the early Dutch administrators showing mixed ethnic backgrounds and a preponderance of people from Celebes origins. Even today people from interior villages know of grandfathers and greatgrandparents who came from Celebes to the area to settle.

21. There is little direct evidence of deliberate resettlement of people by Datu Semawa although there is considerable indication of it. Lekkerkerker (1933, pp. 75-76) merely says there is no evidence of large scale resettlement and that what was done must have been carried out on a small scale. Both Ligtvoet (1876, p. 570) and Kuperus (1936, p. 75) indicate that resettlement has been instrumental in redevelopment of the area and traditions of the area also attest to its importance. The origin of the term *tau merisi* is very likely to be found in the importation of settlers (see note 14). Whatever immigrants were brought in for the royal lands seem to have been largely of the lower social levels in Celebes or other areas of provenience.

22. This explanation was given by a former member of the indigenous government under the Dutch administration. It is, however, not widely remembered. There were also important "centripetal" forces holding the realm together, although they have not been discussed here. Among these must be reckoned the magical aura of the ornament of the

realm (the sacred paraphernalia) and the attraction of the royal court. The attraction of the court lay partly in the opportunities it provided for noble women to "marry up" in status. For a recent glimpse of how the ornament operated in Makassarese society see Chabot's account (1950, p. 67 ff.).

23. This was known metaphorically as "leaping over the gate" (lontak lawang) and is considered traditionally a very grave crime. See Ligtvoet, 1876, pp. 576, 579; also van der Wolk, 1941.

24. This was but one technique apparently utilized and this was fostered by several land resettlement schemes traditionally in effect. Some details to be found in Ligtvoet, 1876, and in Kuperus, 1936, who suggests parallels with royal land holding systems in Makassar (Kuperus, 1937).

25. That the task group system had its origins in western Sumbawa before the 1815 holocaust is quite clear. It should be noted, moreover, that a similar system flourished in the sultanates of eastern Sumbawa (i.e., Dompu and Bima) where they have recently been investigated by G. J. Held. The installation of indirect rule by the Dutch in western Sumbawa in 1906 brought a radical reshuffling of traditional political allegiances within the realm. Although this apparently was done to increase the efficiency of the indigenous administration under Dutch supervision it drastically altered the task group system and did much to hasten its demise.

26. The "mixed marriages" are described in the sources only as those between members of different *ruwe* of the commoners. However, the *ruwe* are not designated as to their size nor clearly as to their geographic residential distribution. The strong presumption therefore is that in the face of conditions of ethnic diversity, the antagonism of the local nobility to the centralized authority of Datu Semawa and the dispersal of task group members into isolated local branches that the "mixed marriages" were no longer described so much by occupational differences per se but by incipient class differences.

27. See Chabot's discussion of these in Makassar (1950, p. 83 ff.). From nineteenth-century Sumbawa there is much evidence of "buying blood," i.e., paying for a royal or noble pedigree. Even Ligtvoet (1876, pp. 557-58) refers to the false use of titles to "prove" nobility.

28. This generalization is based upon a limited inquiry in a village of about 1,500 people some seven miles from the old capital (Sumbawa Besar) which has traditionally been under royal control. However, intensive field investigation of the former task group structure remains to be done.

29. Known as the putés léng keranté

30. The text of this is:

> ku ròa si sompéng kemang
> karéng ka kemang rambaq dén
> mana ké réré kònang rop.

31. For a list of the various traditional types of abduction marriage recognized in the area see Seegler, 1937, pp. 518-20.

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THE EXAMINATION SYSTEM AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN CHINA, 1368-1911

Ping-ti Ho

IN THE STUDY of social mobility of a historical society such as traditional China's, four methodological problems merit our attention. First, the period should be sufficiently long to allow an observation of the unchanged aspects as well as the changing trends, and the geographical coverage should be sufficiently broad. Any generalization based on local or regional data of a limited and sometimes special period is likely to be risky. Second, statistical data must be cross-sectional. Any generalization derived from dynastic histories and the various biographical series which are inevitably achievement-biased cannot be regarded as conclusive. Biographical sketches in local histories, being often extremely brief, are sources of especially dubious value. Third, the criteria of classification must not be based on neat preconceived theory or theories, for historical facts are so complex that they can seldom be reduced to simple patterns. Fourth, in an age in which there is an insatiable desire to theorize, especially in the Far Eastern field, not all scholars remember that factual control, which requires a laboriously accumulated knowledge of legal, institutional, economic, and social history, is a prerequisite to any responsible generalization.

With these four methodological problems in mind, this paper tackles an important aspect of social mobility in Ming-Ch'ing China, namely, the entry into bureaucracy. One of the main bodies of sources used is the fourty-four available lists of Ming-Ch'ing *chin-shih* collected from the three great Eastern American libraries, the National Central Library at Taipei, Formosa, and the National Library of Peking, which yield a total of 11,239 candidates. In addition, there are 22,785 cases from twenty lists of *chü-jen* (successful candidates of the provincial or intermediate examination) and *kung-sheng* (senior licentiates who much like *chü-jen* had opportunity of minor official appointment). While the *chin-shih* lists cover almost the entire period from 1371 to 1904, the latter lists are confined to the nineteenth century and used as supplementary data. The quality of these lists is generally high as they are not only cross-sectional but provide precise information as to whether the candidate's family had produced any officeholder and/or degree-holder during the three preceding generations. Some later Ch'ing lists amount almost to abridged genealogies. These lists are by far the most exact and accurate sources for a study of officials' family background, similar in quality to the two extant Sung lists which form the backbone of Professor Kracke's illuminating article, "Family vs. Merit in Chinese Civil Service Examinations under the Empire."

It ought to be pointed out, however, that our lists theoretically have two defects, namely, the lack of information in many of them on collaterals and the absence of information on the economic status of candidates' families. But thanks to the standardized practice of

conferring honorific titles on officials' ancestors, both living and deceased, those candidates whose direct ancestors were not degree-holders or officeholders but whose close collaterals one or two generations before them were holders of office or higher degrees can as a rule be detected. When detected, they are classified as descendants of officials. As to the second theoretical defect, it may have been serious for the period from the founding of the Ming Empire in 1368 and 1450, when examinations and recommendations were the two only major channels of sociopolitical mobility. But owing to the serious Tartar invasion of the Peking area in 1450 which resulted in the capture of the reigning emperor, the Ming government began to sell minor official titles, offices, and the title of *chien-sheng,* or Imperial Academy studentships. In the course of time it became increasingly common for men of substantial or even limited means to buy such titles. In late Ming and the entire Ch'ing period it may be said that men of above average economic means almost invariably purchased at least an Imperial Academy studentship which cost between one hundred and two hundred taels of silver. For such a small amount of money they could acquire the right of wearing students' gowns and caps and exemption from corvée, thus differentiating themselves from ordinary commoners. For a greater part of the five and a half centuries under study, therefore, our data in fact imply some information on the economic status of candidates' families.

In the light of the power structure and the peculiar prestige and value system in Confucian China, we adopt three standards for classifying the 34,032 holders of higher degrees. Group I consists of those candidates whose families had failed to produce any officeholder or degree-holder in the three preceding generations. From our knowledge of legal, institutional, and social history, and also by implication, these candidates may be regarded as coming from families of humble and obscure circumstances. They thus represent cases of very remarkable upward mobility.

Group II consists of candidates whose families during the three preceding generations had produced one or more *sheng-yüan* (holders of the elementary degree) but no officeholder or holder of a higher degree. Since *sheng-yüan* as a class have been regarded by Dr. Chung-li Chang as members of what he calls "gentry," a brief discussion of their legal, social, and economic status is necessary. Legally and institutionally, as is well known, *sheng-yüan* were undergraduates of county and prefectural schools; as such they were subjected to the periodic tests and reviewing examinations supervised by the provincial educational commissioner and had not right to minor government service, a fact so fundamental that it set them apart from higher degree-holders. Being unable to enter government service, *sheng-yüan* as a class, as revealed in social literature and biographies, were forced to make a meager living by "ploughing with the writing brush, tongue, or inkslab" (that is, teaching in village or private schools for a mere pittance), or by taking up sundry trades and lowly jobs, many of which were legally prohibited because they were considered as too derogatory to *sheng-yüan's* status as government students. The frequency with which the modern researcher comes across cases in which *sheng-yüan* gave up their métier for trade reflects that even in their subjective "felicific calculus" there was greater comfort in more adequate living than prolonged material privation often entailed upon them by their students' status. Within the limited space available it is not possible to discuss fully the technicality of *sheng-yüan's* true social status; however, modern students can understand the problem much better if they remember that after the abolition of the civil service examination system in 1905 the time-honored *sheng-yüan* degree was equated by the government with graduation from grade school. While it is true that a *sheng-yüan's* knowledge of basic classics and ability to

compose essays were superior to those of twentieth-century grade school graduates, his over-all scholastic standing could not have been higher than that of a modern high school graduate. When the *sheng-yüan* is viewed not in the abstract but against concrete social realities, it is impossible to agree with Dr. Chang that he belonged to the theoretically conceived class of "gentry," albeit an adjective "lower" to qualify it.

Within certain limits it is permissible to borrow a foreign term to describe a Chinese social class, but when the difference in the social realities behind Ming-Ch'ing *sheng-yüan* and the English gentry is so great, there is reason to reject the term "gentry" entirely in our study of the Chinese society. For in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries an English gentry owned anywhere between 1,000 and over 10,000 acres of land, usually dominated local adminstration, and was as a rule Tory in his political sympathy. Some keen seventeenth-century French observers of English society could find no French or European analogy to members of the English gentry, whom they called *"nobiles minores,"* an appellation with aristocratic aroma. That *sheng-yüan* and another comparable group *chien-sheng* (students of Imperial Academy, only nominal in the overwhelming majority of cases) should be regarded as a socially significant transitional group at all can be justified only because of the premium that the Confucian society attached to bookish learning. Most if not all of the candidates who came from *sheng-yüan* families and constitute our Group II were relatively humble or even poor.

Group III consists of candidates whose families during the three preceding generations had produced one or more officeholders and/or degree-holders higher than and including *kung-sheng*. These families may be regarded as official and potential official families.

Our criteria for Group I are very strict and those for Group III very lenient. If our criteria has a certain bias, the bias should be on the safe side. From the fourty-four *chin-shih* lists extant, which comprise 11,239 candidates and cover a period of five and a half centuries, we find that Group I accounts for 29.4 per cent, Group II 12.3 per cent, and Group III 58.3 per cent. The combined percentage of Groups I and II (by our definition nonofficial families) is 41.7 per cent.

For the Ming period alone Group I accounts for 44.9 per cent, Group II a mere 2.6 per cent, and Group III 52.5 per cent. In other words 47.5 per cent of Ming *chin-shih* came from nonofficial families. For the Ch'ing period the percentage of Group I drops to 16.5, which is partially though not adequately compensated for by a sharp increase in Group II, which accounts for 20.1 per cent. The combined percentage of Ch'ing *chin-shih* from nonofficial families is 36.6. The crucial change began with the late sixteenth century, when Group I figures drop from over 50 or the high 40's to below 30 per cent, a trend which continues through the early Ch'ing to 1904. For the nineteenth century the average percentage of Group I is slightly under 16. An analysis of 22,785 nineteenth-century *chü-jen* and *kung-sheng* gives an average of 20.6 per cent for Group I, 27.7 per cent for Group II, and 51.7 per cent for Group III.

Although quantitatively it is not easy to say how much is much, there is reason to believe, in the light of roughly comparable studies of social mobility in Western societies, that the amounts of upward mobility in a greater part of the Ming-Ch'ing period are larger than those of modern Western societies. Even the Ch'ing period, which witnessed a continual decline in our Group I figures because of the more restrictive *chin-shih* quotas and the increasingly keen competition which favored the rich and cultured, the combined percentage of candidates from commoner families was still 36.6, comparable at least to that of lower status Americans who moved into the elite in the twentieth century. Since our Group I represents cases of very remarkable upward mobility and since it accounts for

44.5 per cent of the *chin-shih* of the entire Ming period, the degree and amount of upward social mobility in Ming China are probably hard to surpass by any major society, historical or modern.

The factors which contributed to these substantial amounts of mobility were many and varied. We can barely mention in passing the major ones: the unusually sympathetic attitude on the part of early Ming rulers toward the poor and humble; the establishment of government schools at the county, prefectural, and provincial levels; the rudimentary but nationwide scholarship system; the mushrooming growth of private academies which also offered scholarships to the intelligent and needy; the institution of community chests for the express purpose of subsidizing candidates to travel to provincial and national capitals to take higher level examinations; the availability in many cases of educational and financial aid from kinsmen and friends; the effect of the continual expansion of printing facilities; and the intellectual and social emancipation as a consequence of the teachings of Wang Yang-ming. All in all, Ming-Ch'ing China approached more closely than any previous period to the true ideal of Confucius that "In education there should be no class distinctions."

It would be one-sided, however, to say that the competitive examination system was the only major channel for social mobility. Wealth, as a matter of fact, was becoming increasingly important since 1451, particularly after 1850. This can be shown by our analysis of the initial qualifications of active officials. But viewed from the needs of the whole society and from the necessity of maintaining a balance within the bureaucracy, the sale of offices and titles in later Ming and Ch'ing times, much like the system of *paulette* in France under the *ancien régime*, served a not unuseful social purpose.

In addition to examinations and sale of offices, descendants of high officials could also enter government service through *yin*, that is, hereditary privilege. In sharp contrast to earlier periods, however, the scope of *yin* was greatly curtailed in Ming-Ch'ing times. By Ming-Ch'ing practice only officials of three top ranks were entitled to bring one descendant into state service through *yin* as a seventh, sixth, or fifth ranking official. As shown from biographies the *yin* privilege seldom could go beyond two generations. For the entire nineteenth century those who entered the bureaucracy through *yin* numbered only 942, as against 12,477 *chin-shih* and a much larger number of *chü-jen* and *kung-sheng*.

Since the purpose of this paper is to arouse general interest and to invite constructive criticism, I wish to utilize this opportunity to formulate a few tentative generalizations which are based on more than four years' study.

First, for historians the continuity and changes in the social mobility pattern since the permanent institutionalization of the competitive civil service examination system in the late seventh century are worth a brief review. The significance of the examination system on social mobility in T'ang times, though quite obvious, as revealed in Professor Ch'en Yin-chüeh's monumental study of T'ang political history, cannot easily be shown statistically because of the lack of sources similar to ours. There seems to have been a remarkable continuity in the social mobility pattern between Sung and Ming times. Professor Kracke's study of the two extant Sung *chin-shih* lists shows that candidates from nonofficial families constituted 56.3 per cent of the total of the class of 1148 and 57.9 per cent of the class of 1256. These figures are highly significant, although they are not strictly comparable to our figures. The main reason is that in Sung times the passing of the provincial examination was merely a requisite for taking the *chin-shih* examination, not a formal degree or qualification for minor official appointment, as it was in Ming-

Ch'ing periods. A significant portion of Sung *chin-shih* who are technically classified as from nonofficial families may well fall into our Group III, that is, the broadly and leniently defined official and potential official families. Sine the average percentage of Ming *chin-shih* from humble families without officeholders or degree-holders was as high as 44.9 there is reason to believe that the amount of this kind of sociopolitical mobility in Ming times was larger than that during the Sung. This appears all the more reasonable because we know that many channels that promoted upward social mobility, such as government schools, private academies, scholarships, and so forth, were more extensively established after the founding of Ming. In our long-range retrospect, therefore, it may be suggested that the amount of social mobility began to become truly substantial in the Sung, reached its maximum in the greater part of the Ming, started to level off after the late sixteenth century, and continued its downward trend until the final abolition of the examination system in 1905.

Second, in the light of the substantial amounts of social mobility throughout the Ming-Ch'ing period, as compared with those of modern Western societies, it is difficult to say that the civil service examination system failed to serve an important social and political function. Modern students without preconceived theories or prejudice would perhaps rather agree with François Quesnay, a typical eighteenth-century French *philosophe,* who, despite a much idealized picture about China which he acquired from the Jesuits, believed with basically valid reason that by and large the Chinese ruling class was recruited on the basis of individual merit. In fact, the examination system's long history of thirteen centuries is a most eloquent testimonial to its usefulness as a channel of mobility and as a socially and politically stabilizing factor. It is inconceivable for a large nation as pragmatic as China to have perpetuated an institution if it were truly a sham as some modern scholars would have us believe.

Third, as a corollary to the preceding generalization, there is no valid reason to believe that Ming-Ch'ing bureaucracy was a self-perpetuating body. True, the total average of Ming-Ch'ing *chin-shih* from our leniently defined official and potential official families was 58.3 per cent, but the social composition of the bureaucracy was constantly changing. The constantly changing social composition of the bureaucracy was well nigh inevitable because academic success and official appointment owed not so much to blood as to intelligence, assiduity, and perseverance. From our study of the genealogies of some of the most prominent Ming-Ch'ing clans and from extensive social literature, we know that it was very difficult for the average official family to maintain that Confucian puritanical spirit which had accounted so much for its early success. But by far the most important reason for the failure of the bureaucracy to be a self-perpetuating body was the absence of primogeniture and the inevitable process of progressive dilution of family property by the typically Chinese clan and family system. This causal relationship is nowhere more succinctly and piercingly pointed out than by Ke Shou-li, one of the famous censor-generals of the sixteenth century, who, on the occasion of donating some 1,000 *mu* of land as his clan's inalienable common property, remarked: "When the ancient clan system of which primogeniture formed a hard core can no longer be revived, the empire can have no hereditary families; when the empire has no hereditary families, the imperial court can have no hereditary ministers." Small wonder, then, that Ming-Ch'ing China could not have "predestined parliament men" as eighteenth-century England had as a matter of course. Since Ming-Ch'ing China had more institutionalized channels which promoted upward mobility but had practically no institutionalized means to prevent downward mobility, the Ming-Ch'ing society was highly competitive in its own peculiar ways.

Fourth, somewhat different from the gradualness of the processes of social mobility in modern Western societies, our Group I figures and a vast amount of biographical material which cannot be presented here would suggest that there were probably more actual cases of "from rags to riches" in Ming-Ch'ing China than in the modern West, including the United States.

Last, although the amounts of social mobility throughout the Ming-Ch'ing period are substantial by any standard, the significance of the downward trend in our Group I figures must be interpreted in the context of Chinese society at that time. For a nation so used to a "Horatio Alger" sort of social myth, though in a strictly academic and political sense, the steadily shrinking opportunity-structure for the poor and humble must have engendered a great deal of social frustration. It is worth speculating, therefore, whether the persistent downward trend in our Group I figures has had anything to do with social unrest and revolutions that have characterized nineteenth- and twentieth-century China.[1]

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NOTE

1. The complete list of sources will be found in my forthcoming book, *Aspects of Social Mobility in China,* 1368-1911.

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CHANGING CHANNELS OF CULTURAL TRANSMISSION IN INDIAN CIVILIZATION

McKim Marriott

WE SEE the civilization of India changing before our eyes from a rich old cultural mansion of many levels and varied styles into a more uniform structure comprising a few levels of standard design. One way of understanding this ongoing transformation may be to examine it in relation to changes in channels of cultural transmission.

Networks, Centers, Levels, and Specialists

India's indigenous channels of cultural transmission formed very wide and complex networks of many kinds. They connected each small rural community with multiple centers of many types--market towns, seats of different political powers, shrines of diverse deities, educational centers, and so forth. Each indigenous center of Indian civilization was at once distinctive and culturally heterogeneous. The area of influence of each center was also likely to overlap broadly with the hinterlands of other centers. Such an organization of networks and centers interrelated many territorial subcultures (Cohn and Marriott, 1958). Articulating these networks were cultural specialists (Singer, 1955:29-30), serving as "hinge groups" (Redfield, 1956:43-44) or cultural "brokers" (Wolf, 1956:1075-76). There were legions of intermediaries in the networks of Indian civilization, and thus was little need for direct communication between cultural levels. Such a tangled web of indirect and specialized contacts seems to have favored an elaborate cultural stratification and to have conserved and promoted cultural variety (Cohn and Marriott, 1958).

The cultural stratification referred to here as characteristic of past Indian civilization may be defined as a series of broadly coincident distinctions between the more authoritative or widespread cultural traditions, or those which were cultivated by persons of higher standing, or maintained through literary and especially Sanskrit media, on the one hand; and the popular or local cultural traditions, or those carried on by persons of lower standing, or those existing only in vernacular media, or without literacy, on the other hand. Redfield and Singer (1954) have dealt with the extremes of this stratification as a contrast between a "great tradition" and "little traditions." In actuality, one may always have confronted a more subtly graduated series of relatively greater or lesser, more or less authoritative, more or less widespread levels (cf. Singer, 1955, 1958).

That cultural stratification and variety were permitted and promoted by the old networks of communications is shown by several recent studies of cultural transmission. V. Raghavan (1958) lists a large number of media of "popular religious instruction" which for centuries transmitted the messages of the greater Indian traditions to unlettered audiences. Among these media were recitation of fixed oral texts, story telling, singing,

drama, and so forth, each medium having its own specialists, often of several kinds. To Raghavan's list of traditional media, William McCormack (1958) adds the performance of sacraments of the individual's life cycle and the holding of fairs; these media were significant for followers of the Vīraśaiva or Lingāyat religion and undoubtedly have had importance everywhere in Indian civilization. Shah and Shroff (1958) further show how a caste of genealogists in Gujarat worked to connect their earthly patrons, who were not always of the high castes, with ancient, mythical, or even cosmogonic traditions of the prestigious past.

Within a single medium, such as the continuing epic drama, one can see how chains of specialists operated to transmit cultural materials from higher to lower levels. Norvin Hein's description of the Rām Līlā (1958) exemplifies the complexity of this process. Following priestly ceremonies, the biography of Rām is cantillated by a specialist, who reads from a famous seventeenth-century poetic text composed in the vernacular of a neighboring region. This text is itself an adaptation and reworking of an ancient, very widely revered Sanskrit prototype. But even the seventeenth-century text is not easily understood by a modern audience, and not all parts are of interest; yet it is sacred, and must be read in its entirety. Actors fill this gap, dramatizing the more popular passages while the cantillation continues, but putting these passages into succinct modern speech, accompanied by music and gesture, on the stages provided by local houses and temples. Materials of the Hindu great tradition are and were thus conveyed, altered first to regional, then to parochial and nonliterate forms, by a series of intervening specialists. The transmission of cultural materials through such an old-style network, whether downward as in this complex dramatic movement or upward (Marriott, 1955:197-99), typically involved several translations and therefore tended to preserve cultural variety at each level.

Village Structure as a Nonimitative Order

The old structure of Indian rural society was also in several ways inimical to the transmission of cultural materials: to a surprising degree, the old Indian village's social order was a nonimitative order. A case in point is the finding, by John Gumperz, of six distinguishable dialects in a single North Indian village of about five thousand persons. Although one of these dialects is identifiable as the "standard, prestige dialect" of the area, five large segments of the village population do not imitate this model. Instead, they preserve nonstandard dialects peculiar to their respective castes, kin and neighborhood groupings, or conservative outlook. Lack of contact among speakers of these different dialects cannot explain most of the differences, for villagers who speak differently are often engaged in the same tasks and otherwise meet frequently. Yet only friendships among villagers of equal status seem to present effective channels for cultural transmission across dialect boundaries within the village (Gumperz, 1958). Reasons for the conservation of such linguistic diversity must rather be sought in the social structure of the community: occupants of different or lower statuses--members of separate groups or persons standing at the lower end of a ranked relationship, as employee-employer, for example--seem not to regard any higher or more standard dialect as a model appropriate for them to emulate.

One here senses a positive valuation of knowing one's reference group and keeping to it. Martin Orans, in his recent report on cultural change among the Santals of southern Bihar (1959), notes the reluctance of certain tribesmen overtly to adopt higher, Hindu ways.

He explains that emulation of Hindu ways would conflict with the demands of tribal solidarity, which dictate a maintenance of distinctive ethnic features. Such social considerations surely also limit cultural transfer among the Hindu castes.

Probably of great effect, too, in discouraging imitation were certain aspects of village caste hierarchies. Caste ranking in existing villages of old style seems generally to depend on gestures showing actual ritual dominance or subordination in relation to other local castes. For most castes, rank is not much affected by customary attributes as such. The ancient, fourfold classification of *varṇa*--the Brāhmaṇ, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, and Śudra ways of life--represents for villagers not so much a classification of caste ranks as a set of alternative interactional strategies emphasizing use of ritual knowledge, power, wealth, or service, respectively. A caste may rise or fall many steps of rank by use of any one of these four strategies. Generally it has little local incentive to imitate the ideal way of life of any *varṇa* other than that of its own identification (Marriott, 1959). Thus the majority of the meat-eating, liquor-drinking Koḍagus of Coorg can gain recognition as an exalted Kṣatriya caste merely by employing Brahmans and other castes and by stressing their own landed power; they have no need themselves to emulate Brahman vegetarianism, teetotalism, and so forth (Srinivas, 1952:32-34, 227).

Furthermore, even when a higher caste's way of life was emulated or exaggerated by a lower caste, as sometimes happened with the same or related *varṇas*, it was usually the way of life of the local high caste which was taken as the model, not the distant classical ideal. Thus a Distiller caste in the remote village studied by F. G. Bailey, wishing to identify itself with a Brahman like standing in the community, does not feel obliged to give up eating mutton, for the local Brahmans themselves eat mutton; the Distillers merely demand their mutton on the hoof and do their own butchering to insure purity (Bailey, 1957:188-89). This example recalls once more how cultural variety and an elaborate cultural stratification have been generally favored in Indian civilization by the many intermediaries who have stood astride the tangled web of traditional communication channels.

Changing Communications: Two Phases

The changes which have overtaken Indian civilization during recent times may be compared in their effects with several centuries of momentous events in the history of European civilization--the Protestant Reformation and the Renaissance, the development of printing, the establishment of parliamentary governments, the rise of nationalism, the beginnings of mass education and the mass media, and so forth. A partly parallel series of events began in India during the last century of the British period, was greatly accelerated during the past generation, and has been moving toward a climax since independence.

Such changes have had great consequences for India's channels of cultural transmission. A few of the larger centers of civilization have been strengthened in their influence through growth of their own populations, and through the metropolitan concentration of industrial, financial, and political control. Central strength and government patronage have diminished the importance of the many small civilizational centers and have introduced the possibility of developing a more authoritative central version of the national civilization. At the same time, the new means of quick and large-scale communication have been setting up more direct contacts between civilizational centers and rural masses, obviating an elaborate corps of intermediary specialists and cutting through

many previous layers of cultural stratification. Where dozens of readers and actors played a local version of the epic drama of Rām in each of hundreds of provincial towns, a movie on the same theme now issues straight from Bombay or Madras (cf. McCormack, 1958:334-35; Singer, 1958:357-59).

These alterations in the channels of communication appear to be having large effects upon the content and organization of Indian civilization. Two phases of change may be distinguished speculatively: the first affects mainly the little traditions, relating them more immediately with greater levels of tradition, often replacing parts of their content with borrowings of a more Sanskritic sort; the second affects both greater and lesser traditions, as the higher levels are themselves subjected to choice and reduction.

The first phase of change is characteristic of the later nineteenth century, although similar tendencies were to be seen in medieval devotional movements and still continue today. In this phase, indirect, specialist-mediated communication from high to low levels of culture is supplemented by more direct communication on a larger scale. Such communication may have been assisted occasionally in the past by vigorous oral propaganda, but now is facilitated by printing, rapid transportation, and other devices of the new technology. The movement of people and ideas is hastened and intensified both along existing channels in education, pilgrimage, and politics, and along new, shorter, more immediate routes.

This first phase of change is an era of big books, and of increased popular contact with the great books of ancient and medieval Hinduism. This is the juncture at which the oral texts of the Vedas were first reduced to writing. It is the time when epic, philosophic, and ritual texts were first fully published in extensive editions. This first phase thus also initiates the decline of the older oral media, including both the techniques of vedic memorization and the many styles of oral interpretation. Walking libraries begin to be replaced by stationery ones (cf. Ghurye, 1950:1-22).

In the second phase, characteristic of the twentieth century and acutely characteristic of the years since 1947, there arises a national demand for authoritative cultural knowledge. The need to possess a common national culture begins to dissolve the old cultural stratification. In this phase there is necessarily a condensation and selection of small parts out of the vast corpus of classical tradition for mass dissemination. Selection for mass participation means that the more esoteric elements tend to be neglected while other more readily intelligible and accessible, if less sacred, elements are brought to the fore as representative of the transformed great tradition of the civilization. If the first phase is an age of large books, this second phase is an age of pamphlets.

Phases of Change in a Civilizational Center

One can readily perceive the impact of these alterations of cultural channels in one of the great centers of Hindu pilgrimage. The sacred city of Gaya may serve as an example, through the recent report by L. P. Vidyarthi (1959). For more than a millennium, Gaya in Bihar had been celebrated in Sanskrit myths and manuals as one of the foremost places for observing *shrāddha,* the Brahmanic ritual for the worship and pacification of the spirits of departed ancestors. Even by primitive means of transportation and under conditions of political insecurity, probably close to twenty thousand pilgrims had come annually to Gaya during the closing years of the eighteenth century. For Hindus in the more distant corners of India, a pilgrimage to Gaya in each generation had been a mark of cultural aristocracy.

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The advent of the Pax Britannica rapidly raised this annual volume of pilgrims to one hundred thousand persons; later, the establishment of a major railway junction at Gaya helped to raise this number to three hundred thousand persons per year by the early twentieth century. Lavish private donations to the hereditary high priests of Gaya had nourished an elaborate local stratification of sacred specialists, shrines, and theology. But since the Gaya pilgrimage had grown to be a prominent national institution, government patronage and control had become virtual necessities. Priests, pilgrims, and hostels were now licensed and regulated. The claims of formerly subordinate specialists were recognized by courts of law. The wealthy pilgrims' lengthy original tour to forty-five shrines in holy Gaya was reduced for the masses of impecunious visitors to a peremptory call at a mere three or four architecturally notable points. National monuments, state parks, and the buildings of international associations have now begun to rise over the ruins of the sacred ground, while the volume of pilgrimage has declined sharply, a victim of secularism and economic leveling. The great-traditional complex at Gaya thus gained at first a new and more direct relationship with a massive clientele, but was itself then radically transformed by forces inherent in its new network of communications.

Changes at the Village Level: Caste Cultures and Mobility

Recent field studies focused on religious changes among certain low Hindu castes may serve to illustrate the distinction between the two phases as observed at the village level. Bernard Cohn (1955, 1958) shows how the Camārs of one village expressed their ambitions during the nineteenth century and until recent times through the Śiva Nārāyaṇī devotional sect, medieval in origin. The sect stresses the direct relation of the worshipper with certain sacred Sanskritic texts and in its rites imitates Brahmanical rituals. Ambitious Camārs were also seeking to make their family customs conform more closely with what they considered to be model features of the high-caste Hindu family, ignoring an opposite trend among families of the dominant and high-ranking Ṭhākurs in their own village. A second phase of change has begun to emerge only since independence with the extension of political suffrage: the new religious focus is not on ancient models (texts and rituals) but on the person of a Camār saint, Rai Dās, and on legends of his personal virtues and spiritual achievements. Whereas the earlier phase of change was Sanskritic in character and concerned with fuller adoption of the prestigious and esoteric content of high Hinduism, the second phase is popular, exoteric, greatly simplified, and politically oriented to participation in the mass society.

A parallel development may be seen in the changing religion of a group of Sweepers studied in another village by Pauline Mahar (1959). What may be identified as the first or Sanskritic phase was begun for these Sweepers by missionaries of the Ārya Samāj movement of the late nineteenth century. This movement advocated a direct return to the original Vedic texts and ways of worship, and a rejection by the group of intervening levels of culture and specialization. The second phase, inspired at first by the independence movement and led by urban leaders, reinterprets the earlier cult to favor individual effort, education, thrift, and service to the nation.

Difficulties are sometimes met in trying to distinguish these two phases of change chronologically, for the two may occur together. The situation depicted by Cohn (1955, 1958) is by no means rare. Here, members of a low caste were occupied with emulating what they perceived as a high-caste model while members of the local high castes were themselves abandoning that model and looking toward a new national culture. Occasional-

ly, a single group will show both tendencies simultaneously, or a single institution will seem to show two directions of change (e.g., Mandelbaum, 1948:137-39, and 1955:244-45; Gough, 1958:476). A distinction between the two phases may nevertheless be made analytically if attention is given to differences of reference and content in the emulatory process. And generally, the first phase has probably preceded the second.

The foregoing instances concerning the ambitions of contemporary low-caste groups imply that there are modest regularities in changing types of social mobility. It has been pointed out above that before the occurrence of the changes under discussion caste mobility in villages was achieved more by dominance in ritual interaction than by imitation of higher ways of life; when loftier models of customary behavior were chosen, these were usually the actual usages of higher castes in the same village.

Changes in methods of mobility appear to parallel the phases of general civilizational change. Under the conditions of the first phase, low castes typically attempt to improve their standings by altering their customs to resemble the ideal ways of life of the theoretically higher *varna* with whom they claim identity. This is that naïve, direct, literal approach to upward mobility which M. N. Srinivas has called "Sanskritization" (1952:30). While the problem of mobility has undoubtedly been approached in this manner by certain ambitious castes even in earlier times, universal prerequisites of such an approach would seem to include a workable knowledge of the great traditional ideals of the upper castes and a vivid sense of the reality of a wider sphere of social reference than the village (Marriott, 1959). A wide sphere of social reference does come clearly into view for many castes in the later nineteenth century, as suggested by the parallel development of Sanskritization and Westernization (Srinivas, 1956). Srinivas points out, however, that Sanskritization as a technique of mobility is older than Westernization and that the social structural conditions of its earlier occurrence are unknown. Earlier instances of Sanskritic emulation thus need to be re-examined: the present analysis leads to the hypotheses that such older instances will prove to involve castes having a broad social or political stance and an unusually close contact with representatives of higher cultural levels, owing either to their possession of predominant power over a large area, or to other special circumstances.

Finally, the Sanskritic fashion of attempting upward mobility seems to be superceded, as in the examples cited, by a second, modern phase, in which the criteria of rank and the models of high caste conduct are radically altered. Overt ritual dominance and the ideals of *varna* are both rejected in favor of newly drawn, universal standards of economic and intellectual achievement.

Consequences for Cultural Content

The first phase of change described above may be regarded as a continuation of tendencies already inherent in Indian civilization. At first there need be no alteration in the cultural content of the greater levels of tradition. The basis for a broad cultural consciousness has been in existence for many centuries (Redfield and Singer, 1954:68-70), but participation in the higher levels of culture was not previously accessible to many. Aided by printing techniques, increased literacy, and better means of transportation, higher levels of Indian culture are brought within easier reach of favorably placed local groups throughout the society. A broader field of social, as distinguished from cultural, reference comes into existence for more villagers, while the cultural contents of that field are still represented for most persons by great traditional materials, especially the

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widespread Sanskritic culture borne by Brahman castes and other high castes among the "twice-born" *varṇas*. Regional and local variants tend to be bypassed, as do many of the intermediary cultural specialists. But the contents of higher cultural levels remain essentially unaltered while they are imported into the village scene more readily.

The second phase of change, when masses of people come to be directly involved, sees the appearance of greater consequences for Indian civilization; a standard authoritative version, limited in size and scope, must be selected out of the vast and varied range of the ancient whole. School textbooks must be rewritten, symbols of national unification created, ways of representing the nation to the outside world established. Milton Singer has called this process "democratization" (1958:379). Where on an important ceremonial occasion parts of all four Vedas would once have been recited, the time limits of a large gathering now admit room for fragments of but one Veda or none. Where many types of marriage and divorce were normally practiced in rural areas, a single narrow code of law now tends to be imposed on all (Karve, n. d. :211-13). While singers and story tellers used once to travel slowly across the land, bringing high art to each locality in the varied styles of a wide area, many talented performers now look to the radio for an audience and a living, and thereby submit their art to a competitive process of selection, condensation, and standardization. The radio or the mass meeting may communicate cultural material more rapidly to a large audience, but the sum and variety of the material communicated by them are likely to be less.

So also with pilgrimages. The people of each small community once maintained personal, pedestrian ties with a unique series of dozens of regional shrines; now the prestigious grand pilgrimage is accomplished by purchasing a railroad ticket for one of the "standard round tours" encompassing a large part of the whole nation (Central Railway, 1955). The mileage of each pilgrim's travels may be as great as before, but all paths are now narrowed to exclude those hundreds of once-eminent sacred places which are not conveniently close to the main railroad lines. A map of the Indian railroads may thus become a better guide to the sacred geography of the emerging India than any painstaking research into the epic wanderings of Rām and the Pāṇḍavas.

Conclusions

Whether one plots railroads and pilgrimages, the dissemination of books, the movement of personnel and ideas through the modern educational system, the organization of government and elections, or the influence of radio broadcasting, one discovers channels of cultural transmission whose radial or pyramidal form contrasts starkly with the tangled networks of medieval Indian civilization. Dominating the new channels are a few metropolitan centers, nearly identical culturally, having clear and separate jurisdictions. Dominating each urban center are a few relatively centralized institutions.

The emergence of such a new pattern of communications brings with it a newly formed Indian civilization. Two phases may be distinguished. In the first, communication is intensified, one way, from higher to lower levels of culture; Sanskritic models are taken for direct emulation, while intermediate levels and specialists are bypassed; the contents of lesser traditions are replaced by borrowings from above. In the second and succeeding phase, popular needs begin to work changes in the contents and form of the higher cultural levels themselves, selecting and condensing material suitable for mass dissemination as part of a new democratic national culture.

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